

THE WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL'S GRADUATE POLICY WORKSHOP

URBAN EDUCATION THAT WORKS:
MOVING PAST SCHOOL TYPE DEBATES AND EMBRACING CHOICE

GREGORY BANGSER, CHRISTINA BURGESS, THERESA CHALHOUB, ELISABETH COHEN
KATHERINE DISALVO, DREW HAUGEN, CHRISTINA HENDERSON
HEATHER KUGELMASS, DAVID MITCHELL, AND KEVIN SMITH
ADVISOR: HUGH PRICE

JANUARY 2012

THIS REPORT WAS AUTHORED BY:
Gregory Bangser
Christina Burgess
Theresa Chalhoub
Elisabeth Cohen
Katherine DiSalvo
Drew Haugen
Christina Henderson
Heather Kugelmass
David Mitchell
Kevin Smith
under the supervision of Professor Hugh Price

ABOUT THE AUTHORS AND THE WOODROW WILSON SCHOOL

This report was produced by nine graduate students at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs and one at the Department of Sociology as part of a policy workshop in Fall 2011 examining the various facets of public school choice. The client for this workshop was the National Association of State Boards of Education.

The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, founded at Princeton University in 1930, provides an interdisciplinary program that prepares undergraduate and graduate students for careers in public and international affairs. The school is one of the world's premier academic and research institutions devoted to public and international affairs. The views expressed in this report are the views of the authors and do not represent the views of Princeton University, the Woodrow Wilson School, the National Association of State Boards of Education, or those who provided advice. Any errors of fact are the responsibility of the authors.

The authors would like to thank the following individuals who graciously shared their time, experience, and wisdom, and without whom this report could not have been produced.

Van Schoales, *A+ Denver*
Jim Blomberg, *AUSL*
Deb Lang, *AUSL*
Jennifer Roberts, *Baptist Community Ministries*
Jhacole Legrand, *Bellaire High School*
Joel Leagans, *Bellaire High School*
Kate Nocca, *Bellaire High School*
Michael Clark, *Bellaire High School*
Patricia Edaburn, *Bellaire High School*
Frank Barnes, *Boston Public Schools*
Gary Borden, *California Charters School Association*
Megan Reed, *California College Prep Academy*
Seth Bramble, *California Teachers Association*
Juan Garner, *Carnegie Vanguard High School*
Ramon Moss, *Carnegie Vanguard High School*
Lorraine Forte, *Catalyst Chicago*
Macke Raymond, *Center for Research on Education Outcomes, Stanford University*
Celina Torres, *California Dept. of Education*
Kate Floyd, *Chicago Int'l Charter Schools*
Ryan Crosby, *Chicago Public Schools*
Randel Josserand, *Chicago Public Schools*
Jackson Potter, *Chicago Teachers' Union*
Annie Hierholzer, *Children @ Risk*
Jessica Kemp, *Children @ Risk*
Elaine Berman, *Colorado State Board of Ed.*
Paula Evans, *Community Charter School of Cambridge*
Roman Stearns, *ConnectEd*
Debra Vaughan, *Cowen Institute*
Jill Zimmerman, *Cowen Institute*
Laura Mogg, *Cowen Institute*
Jacquelyn Mahatha, *Craig Elementary*
David Cohen, *Denver School for Int'l Studies*
Bill Kurtz, *Denver School of Science and Technology*
Meg LaFave, *Denver School of Science and Technology*
Robert Jeffers, *Dorsey High School, LAUSD*
Rose Drill-Peterson, *Eastbank Collaborative of Charter Schools*
Paula Fendley, *Eastwood Academy*
Bob Lenz, *Envisions Schools*
Danielle Johnson, *Envisions Schools*
Amy Slowthower, *Get Smart Schools*
Rob Stein, *Get Smart Schools*
Yusufi Vali, *Greater Boston Interfaith*
Erica Gonzalez, *Green Dot Public Schools*
Gordon Gibbings, *Green Dot Public Schools*
Betina Jean-Louis, *Harlem Children's Zone*
Bessie Wilkerson, *Harlem Children's Zone*
Mitchell Kurz, *Harlem Children's Zone*
Rusty Carlow, *Harvard GSE*
Richard Elmore, *Harvard GSE*
Tom Payzant, *Harvard GSE*
Jennifer Worden, *Harvard GSE*
Greg Jouriles, *Hillsdale High School*
Jeff Gilbert, *Hillsdale High School*
Sandy Calvo, *Hillsdale High School*
Gayle Fallon, *Houston Federation of Teachers*
Lupita Hinojosa, *Houston ISD*
Lowrey Crews, *KIPP Central City*
Chris Gonzalez, *KIPP Houston*
Brandon Roberson, *KIPP--Opportunity MS*
Brian Johnson, *Larchmont Charter Schools*
Cecilia Chen, *Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights*
Preston Thomas, *Life Academy*
Kathy Riedlinger, *Lusher Charter School*
Charlotte Ciancio, *Mapleton Public School District*
Kenyatta Stansberry, *Marshall High School*
Janet Holmgren, *Mills College*
Kathy Schultz, *Mills School of Ed*
Laura Parker, *Mission High School*
Patricia Perkins, *Morris Jeff Community School*
William Haft, *National Association of Charter School Authorizers*
Neerav Kingsland, *New Schools for New Orleans*
Recy Dunn, *New York City Dept. of Education*
Jaclyn Leffel, *New York City Dept. of Education*
John Alford, *New York City Dept. of Education*
Lewis Cohen, *Oakland Mayor's Office*
Claire Fisher, *Oakland Public Schools*
Susanna Cooper, *Office of State Sen. Darrell Steinberg*
Vicki Symonds, *Parents for Public Schools*
Ellie Rossiter, *Parents for Public Schools*
Ruth Grabowski, *Parents for Public Schools*
Chris Meyer, *Louisiana Recovery School District*
John White, *Louisiana Recovery School District*
Nash Crews, *Louisiana Recovery School District*
Nick Bolt, *Louisiana Recovery School District*
Hydra Mendoza, *San Francisco Public Schools*
Orla O'Keeffe, *San Francisco Public Schools*
Darlene Lim, *San Francisco Public Schools*
Christina Wong, *San Francisco Public Schools*
Elle Rustique, *School Redesign Network, Stanford University*
Erik Rice, *School Redesign Network, Stanford University*
Hanna Doerr, *San Francisco Education Fund*
Mike Klonsky, *Small Schools Workshop*

Janice Jackson, *Center for Opportunity Policy in Education, Stanford University*
Linda Darling-Hammond, *Stanford University*
Michael W. Kirst, *Stanford University, California State Board of Education*
Cazzie Brown, *Summer Search*
Jennifer Cline, *The Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago*
Marcia Fulton, *The Odyssey School*
Sara Carr, *Times-Picayune*
Marv Hoffman, *University of Chicago Urban Teacher Education Program*
Paul Teske, *University of Colorado, Denver School of Public Affairs*
Jean Capizzi, *UP Academy*
Erika McConduit, *Urban League of New Orleans*
Keisha Dubuclet, *Urban League of New Orleans*
Bill Durbin, *YES Prep*
Jennifer Hines, *YES Prep*
Andy Gouldin, *YES Prep Gulfton*

Adam Bower, Michael Schwam-Baird, Brenda Wellburn, Christina Paxson, Karen McGuinness, Melissa Lyles, and Joanne Krzywulak.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

There is an overwhelming need for improvement of public education in the United States today. Low-income and minority students in urban school districts face a particularly bleak educational landscape. In response to serious shortcomings, educators, policymakers, and private actors have moved swiftly in recent years to reform urban education.

Many reformers have focused their efforts exclusively on reimagining urban schools' size, organization, and governance structure. The resulting innovations in school types can now be found in school districts across the country and are the subject of intense policy debates.

Given traditional public schools' failure to effectively educate low-income and minority students, this approach was understandable and not entirely misguided. However, this report—which was informed by a deep review of the literature, field research in nine cities, and over 80 interviews with teachers, students, principals, school administrators, charter management organization staff, policymakers, and researchers—finds that no single school type has enjoyed overwhelming success or faced consistent failure. In fact, the most consistent factor across school types is their inconsistency in performance. In addition, effective public schools—whether they are traditional public schools, small schools, magnet schools, or charter schools—tend to have strong commonalities, including: pervasive mission and culture, a focus on staff quality, provision of deep and differentiated instruction, engagement of families and the community, personalization, and socioeconomic integration.

These findings indicate that it is time to reject tired and often ideologically charged school type debates and embrace reforms that will achieve the six characteristics listed above. Because good schools appear in many forms, and because we still have much to learn about educational success, State Boards of Education should allow a variety of school types to flourish across the state, and should task districts with managing the resulting public school "portfolios."

Districts pursuing a "portfolio strategy" should create an environment that fosters autonomy, accountability, and choice. Like the operator of an airport, "portfolio districts" should focus on providing logistical services and shared infrastructure. Like individual airline carriers, schools should be free to operate— and innovate—with strategic support from the district when appropriate. The core functions of a "portfolio district" are authorizing new schools, monitoring existing schools, turning around or closing failing schools, designing equitable school choice and funding mechanisms, managing shared human and physical capital, and attending to the politics and pace of school choice reform. To help districts achieve excellence in each of these areas, we recommend State Boards of Education pursue the following:

1. Authorizing new schools

1.1 Require all charter (and other autonomous) school applicants to first seek approval from the local school district before pursuing other authorization options.

1.2 Establish a statewide appeals process to ensure local authorizers are giving applicants fair treatment.

1.3 Incentivize all charter school authorizers to follow the National Association of Charter School Authorizers' "Principles & Standards for Quality Charter School Authorizing." Ensure authorizer funding is sufficient for this purpose.

1.4 Mandate all charter school authorizers to make information on their school portfolio—including

statistics on acceptance and renewal decisions—available to the public.

1.5 Place "sophisticated caps" on new school types to ensure that growth does not outpace quality controls.

2. Monitoring existing schools

2.1 Require all charter and other autonomous schools to enter into performance contracts with the district that outline the rights and responsibilities of each party and that make performance metrics and consequences clear.

2.2 Incentivize districts and charter authorizers to use the academic and operational metrics recommended by the Charter School Quality Consortium's National Consensus Panel when reviewing school performance.

2.3 Require the district to have an "exit strategy" for each school in its portfolio should any school need to be closed.

3. Closing or turning around failing schools

3.1 Craft a three-year statewide strategic framework specifically for school turnaround, based on a realistic pace of implementation and expectation of results.

3.2 Instruct the State Department of Education to be more deliberate and bold with the types of models approved for School Improvement Grant applications.

3.3 When an entire school district is failing, consider using a recovery model that brings alternative instructional delivery to persistently low-performing schools or failing school districts.

4. Designing the school choice mechanism

4.1 Encourage districts to pursue an open enrollment system that requires all K-12 students in the district to choose a school. Ensure fairness in assignment mechanisms.

4.2 Ensure districts have ample resources for sharing accessible and easy to understand information with all parents.

4.3 Continue to focus on improving failing schools.

5. Designing the school funding mechanism

5.1 Incentivize the uniform application of budgeting rules across all schools in the portfolio.

5.2 Encourage the use of clear formulas for funding to follow individual students with appropriate funding weights applied based on student need.

5.3 Incentivize consistency in year-to-year funding through multi-year funding guarantees based on current student populations or other reasonable measures.

5.4 Promote targeted supplemental funding for start-up schools.

6. Managing human capital

6.1 Provide districts with incentives to develop human capital pipelines.

6.2 Work with districts and other partners (e.g., graduate schools of education) to develop intensive school leadership training programs and professional development systems that effectively improve teacher and administrator talent.

6.3 Incentivize districts to offer high-paying multi-year bonuses and/or contracts to high-quality school leaders

and teachers to retain them in high-need schools.

6.4 Work with districts to foster district and school cultures that are conducive to employees maintaining proper work-life balances.

7. Managing physical capital

7.1 Grant schools access to low cost tax-exempt bond markets through a statewide conduit.

7.2 Guarantee school facility borrowing by offering intercepts of state per-pupil funding to repay loans, generating a reserve fund, or other similar mechanisms.

7.3 Require that districts charge all public schools for district space at a standardized lease rate and that underutilized space in existing buildings be made available to new or expanding schools.

8. Attending to the politics and pace of reform

8.1 Pursue coherent reforms that can be implemented at a moderate pace.

8.2 Encourage districts to invest in experienced and savvy communications staff.

8.3 Require districts to involve parents and community members in policy changes regarding school development and closure.

INTRODUCTION

Student Achievement in Urban Schools: Why Public Education Reform and Why Now?

There is an overwhelming need for improvement of public education in the United States today. Especially in urban school districts, where standardized test scores tend to be lower than their respective statewide average scores,[1] students face a troubling educational landscape. Significant achievement gaps persist among students of different racial and socioeconomic status (SES). School quality varies tremendously, with some schools seemingly beyond repair. High school and college completion grows ever more important for competing in the job market, yet graduation rates remain troublingly low.

In some urban districts fewer than one in two students graduate, with rates even lower for minority students and students living in poverty.[2] Poor and minority students fill the majority of the nation's drop-out factories.[3] In the U.S., approximately 50 percent of black students, 40 percent of Hispanic students, and 11 percent of white students are enrolled in schools in which less than half of students graduate.[4]

Still, the reform efforts of the last thirty years reveal promise for the future. Racial and SES achievement gaps have narrowed, though progress has been slow and inconsistent. State, local and federal governmental bodies, as well as the private and philanthropic sectors, have increased their investments in urban education, and a galvanized generation of young people passionate about urban education has taken up the charge to improve urban education.

Moreover, there has been a steady increase in the attention paid to urban schooling. The growth of the accountability movement,[5] combined with looser restrictions on who can run schools and how schools can be managed, has spurred a flurry of innovation.[6] Many urban district administrators and their state-level partners now manage startlingly diverse portfolios of schools, including traditional and turnaround neighborhood schools, small themed schools, magnet schools, and charter schools.

REPORT OUTLINE

Reform efforts have not produced a magic bullet to fix the issues that plague traditional public schools; however, several new models of public schooling have emerged. We begin this report by addressing the advantages and limitations of different public school models—traditional neighborhood schools, small schools, magnet schools, and charter schools—recognizing that there is considerable variation within each of these categories. We will examine each school type in terms of performance, equity, and cost.

Despite structural differences between school types, our research suggests that there are some common traits that characterize high-performing urban schools serving the most disadvantaged students. In this report we describe those core overlapping characteristics of effective schools: pervasive mission and culture, a focus on staff quality, provision of deep and differentiated instruction, engagement of families and the community, personalization, and, ideally, socioeconomic integration.

Armed with an understanding of the options for effective schooling, we move to a discussion of how states and districts can manage the portfolio of school types that have emerged. We consider accountability and oversight mechanisms, school turnaround strategies, and school choice systems. In particular, we address

challenges that states and districts face regarding school funding, human and physical capital, political interests, and the pace of reform implementation. We conclude with a series of recommendations to State Boards of Education.

Considerations About Metrics of School Effectiveness

Before evaluating the effectiveness of various school types, it is important to consider the relative strengths and limitations of the metrics on which studies of school impact rely. The National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) is an example of a conventional, direct academic measure of school effectiveness. Because it is nationally normed and administered annually to a nationwide sample of students at various grades, it is one of the most often used metrics. However, some argue that national tests do not reflect important academic outcomes as well as state-level assessments, which are more closely aligned with state curriculum.

State-level assessments like the New York State Regents Exam and the Illinois's Prairie State Achievement Examination measure student progress near the end of their high school education in a variety of subjects such as math and English and enable comparisons across schools within the state. However, they are problematic for measurement of school impact across state lines because state tests vary in (a) difficulty, (b) content, and (c) pass threshold. Another limitation of state tests is their differential application of student exemption rules (such as exclusion of special education students), which can radically change reported results.[7]

Graduation rates are a conventional and indirect academic measure. They serve as a proxy for direct measures of academic achievement, such as standardized test scores or grade point averages (GPA). Graduation rates are readily available. They are a useful reflection of school success because possession of a high school diploma remains important for life outcomes.

However, graduation rates, like GPA distributions, may not be an accurate reflection of the academic skills of a school's students since social promotion practices vary among schools. In addition, graduation rates suffer from a time-lag limitation; that is, they are not sensitive to changes in school effectiveness (e.g., as a result of recent school turnarounds), because they reflect what was happening in the school up to four years prior. Other conventional, indirect academic measures include promotion rates, transfer rates, drop-out rates, four-year completion rates, and attendance rates.

Educators and researchers are hopeful that the introduction of the Common Core State Standards assessments will reduce the limitations of the academic metrics educators currently rely on. These new assessments may be received as more valid measures of different types of learning, like critical thinking, analytical reasoning, and the application of knowledge to novel situations. These assessments will be better aligned with common curricular goals. In addition, they will facilitate comparisons nationwide by permitting larger-scale studies that have more analytical power and face validity. Yet, even those tests will neglect non-academic outcomes (such as economic self-reliance and civic engagement), which are goals of many alternatives to traditional schools and deserve empirical assessment if we are to obtain a complete picture of school effectiveness.

CHAPTER 1: PUBLIC SCHOOL-LEVEL MODELS

Debates rage over what types of public schools hold the most promise for urban students and how best to fund and support these schools. Many large urban districts have made closing failing schools and opening new ones central to their reform efforts. Chicago opened 134 new schools between 1996 and 2006, closing 60.[8] New York opened 200 new small schools between 2002 and 2009 and closed 21 large failing high schools in the same period.[9]

What type of schools should new schools be? In these cases, both cities had an outside, private partner with a firm opinion: in Chicago, the Renaissance School Fund raised over $50 million to open 70 new schools, mostly charters;[10] New York (as well as Chicago) received millions from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to open small high schools.[11]

While some reformers believe a district should pursue a single type school—traditional public schools, small schools, magnet schools, or charters schools—to improve academic achievement, schools often defy easy categorization. The differences between these school types are not always clear. Some charters, for example, have adopted philosophies and practices originally promoted by the small schools movement.

Districts supervise an increasingly complex array of school types. Chicago, for example, has 20 traditional public schools (including two high schools) classified as "turnaround" schools that are run by a non-profit organization, Academy for Urban School Leadership (AUSL). AUSL relies on best practices from the charter movement, and functions as its own school management organization, or supervisory subgroup, within the district. Meanwhile, some districts are opening schools with specially negotiated union contracts that mimic those of charters.

Additionally, there is a tremendous amount of performance variation within a given school type: there are both drop-out factories and high-performing traditional public schools in low-income urban areas; there are some charters that outperform and others that underperform relative to surrounding district schools.

RESEARCH DESIGNS

As mentioned previously, choice of metrics is crucial for examination of relative school effectiveness. Equally important are choices about the context in which those data are collected and the ways in which they are analyzed.

Experimental designs are the gold standard for education research because they randomly assign students to a control and experimental group. The experimental group receives some sort of "treatment," such as attendance at a charter school with a particular philosophy. Because the groups are otherwise equivalent, outcomes can be compared. Experimental studies are made possible (at least in quasi-experimental form) in districts like New York City that hold lotteries for attendance at over-subscribed schools.

Pre-post studies and longitudinal studies are valuable because they can establish temporal priority, and make a valuable contribution to the assessment of school effectiveness for post-high school outcomes like college grades, but they typically cannot control for selection effects. Qualitative observational research adds context and depth to quantitative research, often crucial to the explanation of variance in effectiveness across schools. Meta-analytic studies combine disparate evidence from a variety of study types like those described above to present a coherent picture. Meta-analyses weight stronger studies more heavily and statistically control for the "file drawer effect," which refers to the practice of researchers filing away studies with null results.

States and urban districts must decide what balance of school types to pursue and how that balance will generate optimal results. To facilitate this difficult work, we analyze the four

main types of public schools in urban districts: traditional schools, small schools, magnet schools, and charter schools. We examine each school type in terms of its performance on academic and some non-academic outcomes, equity, and costs. We find that each model has its strengths, but that successful schools of each type often look more similar than different.

TRADITIONAL PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Definition

Traditional public schools are the default for most American students. Unless students choose to attend a private school or a public choice mechanism is in place, students who live in a particular area will attend their neighborhood's traditional public school. These schools vary tremendously in quality, and this variation is strongly correlated to the average SES of the school's students.

Performance

An overwhelming majority of high-poverty urban schools that serve mostly minority students are under-performing. The Century Foundation's Richard Kahlenberg defines high-poverty schools as those with 50 percent or more students eligible for free or reduced lunch and high-performing as schools that performed well in more than one grade and in more than one subject for more than one year. Only 1.1 percent of the 7,000 high-poverty schools are high-performing.[12]

However, while the overall academic performance of these schools in urban areas is deplorable, there are some benefits to having neighborhood schools in a portfolio. In particular, traditional public schools can provide a sense of community because children in the neighborhood schools both learn and live together.[13] Parents argue that student friendships fray when students are scattered across schools instead of staying together at their neighborhood school. In neighborhood schools, parents have the opportunity to make numerous and lasting connections with other parents in the community.[14]

Equity

High-poverty traditional urban schools do not tend to serve minority students well academically. The students in these schools tend to be black or Hispanic and of low SES.[15] Averaging across fourth and eighth grade students in reading and math, racial achievement gaps are evident on National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP); approximately 48 percent of blacks and 43 percent of Latinos score "below basic," while only 17 percent of white students score below basic.[16] This gap is even larger in high-poverty urban schools.[17]

Failing traditional public schools are similarly inequitable. The more motivated and educated students (and parents) opt out of the failing school and attend a magnet, charter, or themed school instead. The students that remain in the failing public school may not have had the option to apply elsewhere, did not apply, or were denied access to a high-performing school and thus continue to receive inadequate education.

Furthermore, retention of quality teachers in urban schools is a challenge. Because teachers often have classes with higher proportions of below grade-level students than in suburban areas, they may not be attracted to teach in high-poverty urban schools. In a sample of public inner city and suburban schools, the U.S. Government Accountability Office found that, overall, low-performing inner city schools had less experienced teachers compared to high-performing inner city and suburban schools. [18]

Cost

Per-pupil spending differences between urban and suburban schools varies by city, but when

weights are applied to compensate for student needs, urban students typically receive less funding per pupil than their counterparts in suburban areas.[19] The differences in spending are due mostly to differences in salaries and student-to-teacher ratios,[20] meaning that suburban schools are more likely to have higher salaried teachers than urban schools.

Busing students to neighborhood schools can be less expensive than busing students to other types of schools. For example, the current policy in Boston that allows for school choice costs approximately $40 million more than a neighborhood school model.[21] Neighborhood schools also save money on transportation because some students can walk and bike to school.

SMALL PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Definition

Small, district-run public schools come in various shapes and sizes. Some were formed as stand-alone new schools and others came to be through the division of large schools into small learning communities, themed schools, or academies that share the same building. Some small schools arose recently as part of a federally-supported "restart" effort; others, like Fenway High School in Boston, were founded by education leaders nearly thirty years ago. Some small schools are populated by students who self-select into them, while other small schools have students assigned to them. Because of this variability, it is difficult to characterize and catalog small schools.[22] Nonetheless, there are some commonly cited characteristics that they share. Small schools typically have fewer than 400 students.[23] They tend to emphasize depth over breadth of academic instruction, have enhanced opportunities for interpersonal support, seek the engaged involvement of home and community, and have leaders with the autonomy to make decisions about the school.[24]

Small schools are products of experimentation by educators and researchers dissatisfied with traditional comprehensive urban high schools, which in recent decades have been criticized for letting students fall through the cracks of an anonymous bureaucracy and swollen school population.[25] Due to some early success, small school reforms developed into a full-fledged movement by the end of the 1980s.[26] In the mid-90s the movement received a big boost through the Annenberg Challenge Grants, which were followed by grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation grants at the turn of the century. [27]

Performance

Since the height of the small schools movement in the mid-90s, mixed evidence has led to a reconsideration of the role of school size in secondary education reform. The positive impact of small schools has been called into question by even its once ardent supporters like Bill Gates, who has since abandoned his initiative.[28] Advocates of small schools agree that size is not a sufficient criterion for success, but there is disagreement among proponents about whether small size is necessary for, or simply conducive to, success. Opponents argue that some features of small schools are detrimental, with most of their objections focusing on issues of equity.

A review of the many studies conducted on small schools reveals that the evidence on their efficacy is far from conclusive. Broadly, there is empirical support for social benefits conferred by school size, but inconclusive evidence regarding academic gains.

MAPLETON PUBLIC SCHOOLS: SMALL BY DESIGN

Mapleton Public Schools is an example of small public schools implemented at a district-wide level. Located in northeast Denver, Mapleton Public Schools consists of 17 small-by-design schools. Mapleton faces many of the same challenges as other city districts: 68 percent of its 8,000 students are eligible for free or reduced lunch and 45 percent are learning English as a second language. But Mapleton is unusual—not only in Colorado, but nationwide—because all schools in the district are designed to function as small learning communities that provide students with a family-like environment and opportunities for active learning.

Mapleton boasts a wide variety of schools within the district, with some favoring a more traditional approach (just in a smaller setting) and others focusing on expeditionary learning or the arts. Mapleton is an open-enrollment district in which there are no defaults: students and their parents/guardians must go to the district's Welcome Center to receive counseling and select into a school.

While unorthodox, Mapleton has demonstrated impressive results: math and writing test scores in all grades have steadily improved for five years and the district now outperforms most other school districts in Denver. However, Mapleton still has a long way to go—Mapleton students still perform far below state averages in every subject area.

Mapleton is addressing a common criticism of small schools (that they have an inability to offer a variety of extracurricular activities) by forming sports teams, clubs, and social events that span multiple schools. Apart from satisfying students' and parents' desires for extracurricular activities, this after-school mixed socialization may also reduce the racial and socioeconomic segregation that often plagues small schools into which students self-select.

Schools that are small by design take a variety of shapes and see differing levels of success. Effective small school models in one city may not be replicable elsewhere, but they can inform efforts to achieve the benefits facilitated by small schools without losing the opportunities afforded by large ones.

Social Outcomes

Reviews of the literature on social outcomes at small schools suggest that students benefit from closer relationships between students and teachers as well as among students.[29] Specifically, reviewers report that in smaller schools students feel safer, display fewer behavioral problems, participate more frequently in extracurricular activities, and are less likely to vandalize or commit acts of violence.[30] Positive social relationships appear to extend to various types of small schools, including schools within schools.[31] Students hold higher aspirations and more positive educational attitudes, and teacher communities are more cohesive.[32]

Teachers confirm that in small schools students develop stronger peer networks and benefit from interactions with teachers who know them well.[33] Teachers also report fewer classroom disruptions (e.g., tardiness), more opportunities to connect with parents, and a better ability to monitor students' performance.[34]

One example of the power of a small school to produce positive social outcomes is found in the Career Academies. They are organized as learning communities around a career theme and have produced positive impacts on independent living, marriage, and custodial parenthood.[35]

Academic Outcomes

With respect to academic outcomes, results are more mixed. Literature reviews conclude that, all else equal, small schools have lower drop-out rates, better attendance rates, higher average grades, stronger performance on standardized exams, fewer failed courses, and higher

graduation rates.[36] Yet, some scholars caution that there are only slight academic improvements in reading and none in math.[37] Still others find the reverse: minor improvements in math but none in reading.[38] This lack of clear, across-the-board academic improvement is one of the reasons the Gates Foundation has moved its attention away from small schools and toward instructional practices.

The reported effects of school size on academic outcomes have varied by metric, study, region, and origin (conversion or new). One study that merits particular weight due to its unusual rigor is a large-scale randomized study of small schools in New York City.[39] This study found that students in small schools earned more credits, failed fewer classes, scored higher on English state exams (but not math exams), and were more likely to graduate.[40] On the other hand, an observational study of New York City's small schools found that the improvements in graduation and attendance rates faded over time.[41]

Another evaluation deserving of attention is the aforementioned study of Career Academies. Graduates of Career Academies earned 11 percent more than those in traditional high schools. These effects were strongest for black men, which is notable given that low-income young men of color are hardest hit by the economic downturn.[42] However, the study found no difference in standardized test scores, graduation rates, postsecondary matriculation, or completion from these vocational schools.[43]

Yet, other advocates insist that small schools increase overall achievement levels and decrease the achievement gap,[44] often citing the success of the public pilot schools network in Boston, which demonstrated higher performance on the state standardized test, lower in-district and out-of-district transfer rates, higher attendance rates, and higher college enrollment rates.[45,46]

Does Newness or School Size Matter?

There is evidence that newly started small schools have a greater likelihood of success than redesigned large failing schools,[47] but there is some concern that much of the new school advantage may be accounted for by selection effects related to student demographics.[48]

There is also continued debate about the ideal size of schools. Some empirical evidence suggests schools can be too small as well as too large. One study found that regardless of a school's racial and SES composition, learning is maximized with an enrollment of 600 to 900 students.[49] This is in contrast to the fewer than 400 students recommended by small schools advocates. It may be that for socio-emotional outcomes (as mediated by interpersonal interactions), less than 500 students is ideal, but academic outcomes are facilitated by somewhat larger schools.[50]

Equity

Small schools target low-income students and students of color. After all, large comprehensive high schools are not viewed as problematic in affluent neighborhoods, where parents value the variety of course and extracurricular offerings that are rarely available in smaller schools.[51] It is partly in response to limited course and extracurricular offerings that small *themed* schools have emerged, enabling students access to some offerings that align with their interests, while still maintaining their commitment to a small, nurturing environment.[52]

The largest equity issue is that by selecting small schools within a choice system, students will self-segregate. This phenomenon has been examined most closely in the context of schools within schools, but can occur to any small public school in a choice system.

Based on an in-depth study of five schools, each containing themed sub-schools, researchers concluded that schools-within-schools promote social and academic stratification, with student

bodies largely segregated by race/ethnicity and social class.[53] They observed that self-selection into a sub-school quickly produced an academic hierarchy of sub-schools, with academic achievement and motivation predicting enrollment in highly rigorous sub-schools with high-status themes. Students' initial selections led sub-schools to develop reputations that influenced future students' and teachers' placement preferences.

Although many praise the positive peer effect generated by the concentration of highly motivated students in the same sub-school, few address the detrimental peer effect generated by the concentration of low-performing and behaviorally-challenged students in the same sub-school.[54] The lack of institutional attention to this concern in part comes from an interest in pleasing the high-income parents, who sometimes favor the segregation; low-income parents often lack the "voice" to object to it.[55] Some suggest that an integrated, more equitable environment can be created only by ensuring that each small school has a representative achievement-level mix, which in turn results in a desirable racial and class mix.[56]

Cost

It is argued that small schools do not have sufficient resources to support all of their students, especially those from disadvantaged backgrounds, and that community services do not have the capacity to completely fill the gaps in services provided.[57] It is intuitive that the economies of scale achieved by large schools are lost in small ones.[58] Successful small schools often rely on considerable external philanthropic support, so detractors argue that the proliferation of small schools is not a scalable—and perhaps not sustainable—solution in today's economy. Yet, small school proponents point to a study conducted by New York University's Institute for Education and Social Policy, which found that although schools with fewer than 600 students spend more per *student* than schools with over 2,000 students, the per-*graduate* cost is actually slightly lower at small schools on account of their higher graduation rates.[59]

State Boards of Education should recognize that school size is not a panacea. The evidence suggests that small schools can do some, but not all, of what they were intended to accomplish.[60] Instead, school size should be viewed as one of many possible tools for improving outcomes for urban students—and one that is rife with tradeoffs.

MAGNET SCHOOLS

Definition

While there are many kinds of magnet schools, these schools tend to be distinct in that they have a specific focus and use various methods to select students, often with the aim of creating a diverse student body. The U.S. Department of Education defines magnets as "all schools or instructional programs that have a unique theme or focus conceived to attract students and parents for the primary goal of creating a representative student population."[61] The first magnet school, started in 1968 in Tacoma, Washington, had just such a purpose, aimed at creating a racially integrated environment for students.[62] Such schools began to proliferate in the 1970s and 1980s, and by the 1999-2000 school year there were 3,026 magnet schools around the country with the explicit purpose of desegregation.[63]

As demand rose for magnet schools, many schools began choosing students by lottery.[64] There are now a variety of methods that magnets use to select students including the use of an attendance zone, where some spots are reserved for students within a specific geographic area, lottery systems, or merit-based applications with auditions or other criteria.[65] Roughly two-thirds of such schools use a lottery method to select students, while one-third choose students based on merit or talent.[66] The selective schools may have integration as a goal,

but often focus more on providing a high-quality education to the students able to gain admission.[67] The function of magnets has also expanded as time has passed, with magnets now being used for such purposes as providing families with more choice and serving as a testing ground for new instructional methods.[68]

Performance

The positive academic effects of socioeconomically integrated schools (see *Characteristic 6: Socioeconomic Integration*) are well documented, and to the extent that magnet schools can achieve such a level of integration, students are likely to benefit from those effects. A few studies have examined the specific academic performance of magnets. One shows that magnets had positive effects on urban students' proficiency in science, reading, and social studies as compared to traditional public high schools.[69] Other studies, however, found positive academic effects initially, only to see them disappear when factors like student demographics, prior achievement, and academic ability were statistically controlled.[70]

Equity

A critical feature of magnet schools is their ability to attract families and students from a variety of backgrounds and create a unique mix of students. Several reports and studies have examined this quality of magnet schools, analyzing the effects a diverse student body produces. Richard Kahlenberg argues that the best way to turn around schools is by creating magnet schools that change the faculty, student, and parent mix.[71] Citing a 45-year line of research, beginning with the Coleman Report (1966), he concludes that the magnet turnaround model improves education by attracting middle-income students to low-income schools.[72] Furthermore, Kahlenberg discusses how integrating schools based on race does not produce the same academic achievement effects as a strong socioeconomic mix of students.[73] Given the uneven achievement gains of black students through racial desegregation, the research has shown that academic achievement is tied more closely to the integration of students of different socioeconomic groups than the integration of students of different racial backgrounds.[74]

Not all gains regarding economic integration of schools should be unequivocally accepted, however. A recent study raises some questions regarding the positive effects displayed by economically integrated schools, finding that low-income students showed poor academic outcomes when they were placed in school with more middle and high-income peers, and negative psychosocial effects when placed with relatively more middle or high-income peers or more peers with college-educated parents.[75]

Some argue that while magnets may be successful at integrating students based on factors like race and socioeconomic status, they separate students in other ways—mainly by ability levels.[76] These critics believe that magnets take the best students from their neighborhood schools, leaving other students at a disadvantage because they miss the benefits of being in classes, and sharing a school environment, with high-achieving peers.[77] However, the U.S. Department of Education sees this feature of magnet schools in a more positive light, stating that the presence of magnets, and the high-quality education they provide, can induce neighborhood schools to better serve the general student population, as they have to compete for students in such a system.[78]

Costs

An early study regarding the cost of magnet education showed that, overall, magnet schools cost more than other types of schools.[79] However, when these costs are broken down by grade level, secondary magnets are shown to cost more, while elementary and intermediate magnets actually cost less than traditional public schools.[80] In addition, per-pupil costs decreased over time, primarily due to increases in enrollment that lowered per-pupil fixed costs,

such as equipment.[81] Higher costs also tended to reflect better integration as well as quality of education, suggesting that spending more leads to better outcomes.[82] Another consideration regarding magnet schools is busing, which produces costs in the form of basic transportation expenses like gas and vehicle maintenance, commute, time, and reduced ability for students to participate in after-school activities and parents to volunteer or otherwise spend time in the school.[83]

CHARTER SCHOOLS

Definition

Based on a concept generated in the late 1980s and first implemented in 1991, charter schools are so named because they receive a "charter" from an authorizing agency that typically provides for both autonomy from district rules and accountability to the authorizing body. They are often exempt from a variety of regulations—most notably budget guidelines, curriculum requirements and union work rules—and, in return, are held accountable for financial management and student achievement.

However, some schools with substantial autonomy do not have the "charter school" label while other schools with the label are closely supervised. Boston's pilot schools, for example, are not charter schools but have autonomy over staffing, budget, curriculum, and other decisions. In return, they are held accountable through a high stakes review process.[84] In contrast, "internal" charter schools in Houston are nearly indistinguishable from traditional public schools in terms of their lack of freedom to make staffing, budget, or curriculum decisions.

In addition, autonomy does not guarantee a changed environment; even charter schools with substantial autonomy sometimes look distinctly like traditional public schools. This is likely attributable to tight authorization and funding environments that make traditional choices the path of least resistance. Additionally, some charter management organizations (CMOs) provide intensive oversight of their member schools, which approximates the behavior of a district and minimizes individual differences among schools. Finally, the pressures of the environment are often compounded by the natural inclinations of charter school leaders who tend to have traditional education degrees and who frequently began their careers as traditional public school administrators.[85]

Performance

Nationally, charter school outcomes are characterized by their inconsistency across individual charter schools rather than by any overall pattern of performance advantages or disadvantages relative to traditional public schools. A comprehensive meta-analysis of the available charter school literature published in October 2011 formally verifies that the most defining characteristic of charter school performance is its variability, with positive effects in some locations, subjects, and grade levels and negative effects in others.[86] Furthermore, this pattern of performance variability without statistically significant average positive effects, surfaced in a recent Mathematica study of CMOs despite the widely held belief that CMOs are the high-performing answer to our under-performing district schools.[87]

Stanford University's Center for Research on Education Outcomes (CREDO) released a comparison group matching study in June 2009 that examined students in 16 states. Its most widely quoted finding is that 17 percent of charter schools perform better than surrounding district schools while 46 percent perform the same and 37 percent perform worse. The authors conclude that "tremendous variation in academic quality among charter schools is the norm, not the exception."[88] The report's methodology came under heavy attack

from Caroline Hoxby, another researcher at Stanford, who responded with a paper titled "A Serious Statistical Mistake in the CREDO Study of Charter Schools."[89] The essential lesson is that, while legitimate methodological debates exist, it is clear that some charter schools outperform their district peers, while many are no better and some are actually worse.

In urban districts, performance variability remains substantial, but the pattern of results indicates that, on average, charter schools outperform traditional public schools. The same meta-analysis that found mixed but generally neutral results for charter schools nationally uncovered larger gains in urban areas.[90] In fact, of five randomized control trials of charter schools reported as of the end of 2010, all four in urban areas showed significant positive results.[91]

Most interestingly, given the CREDO-Hoxby dispute over national charter school performance, both parties agree that urban charter schools tend to outperform neighboring district schools. The subset of CREDO's national sample that originated in New York City contained far more charter schools outperforming their district counterparts (29 percent in reading and 51 percent in math).[92] Hoxby's study of New York City charter schools, which used random assignment, found that attending a New York City charter school from kindergarten through eighth grade closes the "Scarsdale-Harlem achievement gap" between high-SES suburban schools and their low-SES urban counterparts by 86 percent in math and 66 percent in English.[93] In short, it appears that charter schools in urban districts are likely to outperform their neighboring traditional public schools and that some of these differences are large enough to be substantively important.

Equity

Current evidence indicates that charter schools slightly over-represent some high need groups—poor, black, and Hispanic—and under-represent other high need groups—English language learner and special education. However, there are limited data on these trends and a lot of variability in the data that are available.

Prior to reaching any tentative conclusions on the controversial issue of whether charter schools serve *all* students, it is essential to note that a lack of data makes it extremely difficult to generate any rigorous answer.[94] Nevertheless, observational data from a variety of studies and regions have supported anecdotal observations of these patterns.

Multiple investigations of the Knowledge is Power Program (KIPP)—the largest CMO nationwide, and one that is often cited for its success—have uncovered trends of more low-SES and minority students in charter schools, but fewer English language learners and special education students.[95] This is evident in Boston, where charter schools tend to have fewer English language learners and special education students than their district counterparts.[96] It also appears in New York City, where charter schools have higher concentrations of black students and poor students than traditional schools in the district.[97]

These patterns, however, likely result from the limited choice systems currently used by many districts to assign children to charter schools, not with any inherent difference between charter schools and traditional public schools. Some choice systems can result in differential rates of enrollment in and attrition from charter schools among certain groups of students.

Cost

While disputes exist over relative spending levels between charter schools and traditional public schools, especially when private contributions are considered, most differences in expenses between charter schools and traditional public schools are not associated with characteristics inherent in the charter

school governance model. The primary exception to this rule is additional administrative expenses produced by duplicating district oversight services.

Traditional public schools tend to receive more direct per-pupil allocations—a difference of $2,980 according to one recent study—but this advantage disappears when one considers supplemental funds and services that charter schools receive from districts.[98] In New York City, for example, after adding supplemental direct funding of $1,218 for items like transportation and other operating expenses plus $2,712 for facilities support, the gap between charter school funding and traditional public school funding closes from $4,235 to $305.[99]

While most observers agree that some charter schools receive substantial outside funding, this amount varies widely from school to school. In New Orleans, the highest spending charter schools have per-pupil expenditures of almost double the lowest spending charter schools ($16,537 versus $8,481), driven largely by variations in private support.[100] Charter school providers, like KIPP, argue that this outside funding is used largely to level the playing field between traditional public schools and charters where public funding is particularly inequitable in terms of capital, start-up, or operating costs.[101]

Specialized start-up funding is of particular concern to charter schools and is a substantial expense—averaging $287 per student annually over a four-year phase-in period for a new charter school in New York City.[102] This cost, though, exists for any start-up school and is not driven by the charter school governance model. Similarly, charter schools may frequently incur expenses associated with added instructional hours, but these expenses apply equally to other high-performing schools that employ extended school days or years and therefore are not inherently associated with charter school governance.

Charter schools do present at least one unique funding challenge: duplication of district-level services. If charter schools operate independently of districts, they must provide their own administrative and operations functions. Replicating these services on an individual school level is quite expensive and charter schools have reduced, though not eliminated, this expense by expanding successful schools into charter school networks with a shared central office staff or, more rarely, banding together into coalitions of independent schools. An outstanding success story of such a coalition is the Eastbank Collaborative in New Orleans, which consists of 12 charter schools that share best practices and services such as legal, accounting, and maintenance.[103]

None of the school-level design models examined above achieves universal success, but each model has high-performing exemplars. Strikingly, across all governance models, high-performing schools that serve low-SES students and students of color tend to share a group of core characteristics: pervasive mission and culture, focus on staff quality, provision of deep and differentiated instruction, engagement of family and the community, personalization, and integration. This shared set of features does not preclude substantial differences across schools, but does offer some insight into what makes schools successful.

CHARACTERISTIC #1: PERVASIVE MISSION AND CULTURE

The research literature, as well as observational evidence from our field research, has shown that one unifying feature of high-performing schools is a strong and pervasive mission and culture that enjoys buy-in from the entire school—administrators, teachers, staff, families, and students. There are two aspects of mission that particularly drive the culture of high-performing schools, regardless of school type.

The first aspect is high academic expectations for all students. When educators believe that all students can learn, they will push all students to succeed. At the Denver School of Science and Technology (DSST) Stapleton Middle School campus, teachers frequently spend hours per week working to remediate students who are below grade level and tutor them after school during College Prep sessions. Teacher tutoring is required for any student who fails a quiz or test, and every student has a teacher advisor who monitors his or her performance and maintains contact with the student's parent or guardian.[104]

DENVER SCHOOL OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY: A PERVASIVE MISSION AND CULTURE

The charter network's internal motto, "Culture is King," is not just a catchy phrase that adorns the office notepads. The "core values" of the Denver School of Science and Technology's (DSST)—Respect, Responsibility, Integrity, Courage, Curiosity, and Doing Your Best—are visible in public spaces and classrooms as well as evident in the student learning experiences. Advisory period lessons are centered on exploring the meaning of the core values, and students receive "core value points" on teacher trackers towards weekly "paychecks" that are redeemable for prizes. Students who have exemplified a core value can be recognized at the school's "morning meeting," a gathering of the entire school.

The core values serve another important purpose, namely, providing a constructive framework for "teachable moments." Students who break a core value are expected to explain what core value they broke and how they will fix this behavior in the future. For more serious behavioral transgressions, such as cheating, students are required to make a public "suspension apology" to the whole school during the morning meeting, after which other students may ask questions and the whole student body votes whether to readmit the transgressing student back into the community.

DSST Public Schools set high behavioral and ethical standards for all of their students. Moreover, these values are shown not just in words, but in the actions of students—exemplary and non-exemplary. What is important is that the standard is set high, all students are expected to meet that standard, and interventions and constructive "teachable moments" are provided for students who do not meet that standard. Making mission and culture a high priority has yielded impressive academic results: 100 percent of DSST graduates in the last four years were admitted to four-year colleges.

The second aspect is high behavioral and ethical standards. High-performing schools do not typically have major behavior problems. Instead, high-performing schools take every opportunity to develop their students' character in alignment with their mission.

By managing their school with a focus on an effective mission, school leaders can align, unify, and strengthen the sometimes far-flung operations of a school. In less effective schools, curriculum design, financial management, policy advocacy, community relations, parent involvement, staff development, and long-term planning are typically treated as isolated tasks, to be dealt with only as needed. Strategic management can reduce the fire-fighting nature of running a school.[105]

Effective missions of high-performing schools have the following common features.

1. Statement of General Values. This statement explains the orientation of the school—whether it values safety and order (uniforms, assigned seats, address adults with formality) or is more free and open (emphasizes social justice, environmentalism, infusion of community service).

2. Educational Approach. This is a plan for *how* students will learn. At a discipline-focused school, learning might emphasize student drills, hard work, and frequent student assemblies. A more open school might adopt a progressive or constructivist approach. Other schools take a technology-based tone, emphasizing computer literacy.[106]

3. Curricular Approach. This is a plan for *what* students will learn.

4. Target Student Population. This refers to what kinds of student population(s) the school is intended to serve.

5. Definition of Ambitious but Reasonable Goals. These are "goals that are clearly articulated and agreed-upon are much easier to aim for, and hence achieve, than imprecise or poorly articulated ones."[107]

A strong, cohesive, and clear mission provides a framework for strategic management and coordination and internal organizational synergies while also providing a backbone for a strong and constructive school culture.

CHARACTERISTIC #2: FOCUS ON STAFF QUALITY

The school leader, along with the staff he or she hires and develops, is directly responsible for generating and executing each of the five other characteristics of high-performing schools discussed in this section. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that, from organizations that incubate charter schools[108] to researchers investigating high-performing traditional public schools,[109] a consensus exists that a high-quality principal—one who is willing and able to do whatever it takes to create a successful school—is essential.

Once in place, high-quality leaders must ensure they hire high-quality staff. This is achieved by identifying an adequate candidate pool (see *Human Capital Challenges* for promising methods) from which leaders of high-performing schools can hire their faculty using a rigorous interview and selection process. The process in high-performing charters often requires at least one full day visit (including interviews with both peers and administrators) and a sample lesson demonstrating teaching practice. This process goes beyond testing general teaching competence to ensure that the candidate is a good cultural fit for the school. This is needed because teaching competence is necessary, but not sufficient, to be a high-quality teacher in high-performing schools that emphasize mission and culture.[110] Observational studies of high-performing traditional public schools have confirmed that they use a similarly rigorous hiring process[111] and that the leaders achieve this process by bypassing district hiring schedules and systems.[112]

In addition to individual staff development and retention, high-performing schools create a collaborative work environment where staff can benefit from one another's expertise.[113] Furthermore, high-performing schools frequently use a distributive leadership model that allows administrative responsibilities to be spread among leaders and teachers.[114] This model reduces the pressure on school leaders while providing growth opportunities for classroom teachers.

CHARACTERISTIC #3: DEEP, DIFFERENTIATED INSTRUCTION

Students are diverse; they have a wide array of academic, language, and learning abilities. To address these differences successfully, high-performing schools of all types must differentiate their instruction while maintaining rigor.

One important best practice of effective schools is the use of formative assessments and available data to facilitate differentiated instruction. To provide differentiated instruction to each student, students must be assessed. Schools must understand student performance and create targeted instruction with effective evaluation tools. Technical support, particularly around regular student data collection and the assessment development, is necessary for teachers to provide differentiated instruction.[115]

Formative assessments take various forms. For example, teachers can have students write papers and create multi-faceted projects as a method of assessment. To improve teacher use of data, school districts and schools should provide training for teachers regarding the creation of effective assessments to meet the needs of their students and to use these data to improve learning outcomes. Differentiated instruction requires placement of students in small, fluid groups. (Note that this is distinct from tracking because differentiated instruction involves groups that are temporary, small, and form within the classroom.) Placement of students in the appropriate groups depends on frequent assessment.[116] Assessments can also enable teachers to identify students in need of high-dosage tutoring,[117] and to customize academic plans.[118]

Assessment data also can be used to evaluate how districts and teachers are performing compared to one another. If principals and administrators discover that their students are not doing well and another school is doing better, they can visit the higher-performing school to learn their best practices.[119]

A second best practice is encouraging teachers to dive deeply into the curriculum and teach beyond the standards. Teachers in high-performing schools teach topics that meet state standards with a sharp focus, but these teachers also teach curriculum beyond the state assessments.[120] Teachers focus on skills, such as literacy and analytical reasoning, which will help their students succeed inside and out of educational settings.

A third best practice is lengthening the time students spend in school and using that time effectively. Extended school time, wisely used, offers staff more time in which to pursue student support, professional development, and other best practices of high-performing schools. Whether achieved through extended days or extended years, increased time in school has been found to be essential by many,[121] but not all,[122] researchers. Longer school days facilitate the implementation of other aspects of high-performing schools, such as student support and professional development, which often rely on time outside of the instructional day.[123]

It is not only charter schools that can lengthen school days. Many successful schools of various types extend their school days by using funds that are available from the federal government and staying within the boundaries of the teachers' contracts. Some start school early and end late; others provide an intersession when students who are not performing well have a chance to take extra classes to catch up. High-

performing students can also benefit from extended days by attending music, drama, or other enrichment classes.[124]

Characteristic #4: Family and Community Engagement

Research shows that family and community engagement is a characteristic of high-performing schools of all types. A study of Chicago public, neighborhood-based elementary schools in the 1990s found that relationships with parents and the larger community were one of five essential components of school success and improvement.[125] A study of successful turnarounds in Virginia identified "intensified efforts to inform and engage parents and community members" as one of 10 "essentials" of school turnaround that emerged from their case studies.[126] KIPP schools require parents to sign a contract that commits them to home-based and school-based engagement as a precondition of a child's admission;[127] this is a technique many other charter schools have adopted.

A parent or guardian's engagement with his or her student's education can take many forms. Home-based engagement includes reading with a student, helping with homework, and discussing academic plans. School-based engagement can include volunteering, contributing to school governance, or working with a non-profit community group to influence one's local school and district.[128] Some studies have shown home-based guardian involvement as the most effective way families can help students, while other studies have found school-based involvement to have stronger effects.[129]

Family involvement has impressive effects on student outcomes. A meta-analysis of all available quantitative data on parent involvement in elementary schools found a "considerable and consistent relationship" between parental involvement and urban students' academic achievement.[130] Parent/guardian involvement can improve student mental health, help students develop study skills and motivation,[131] and increase the time spent on homework and homework completion. In students' adolescent years, parental involvement is associated with students doing better in school, having more plans for the future, spending more time on homework, and completing more homework assignments.[132]

The positive effects that family engagement has on students' education is notable because these effects do not appear to be explained by parents' socioeconomic status or educational attainment,[133] and the improvement in test scores is seen in both genders and among whites and minorities.[134] This means every parent or guardian can help his or her student improve.

Parental and community engagement does not just help individual students, but can also make whole schools stronger. Parent-school relationships can create a productive culture of mutual trust and increased involvement.[135] The Annenberg Institute for School Reform recently studied schools that are collaborating with community organizing groups like Padres y Jovenes Unidos in Denver,[136] and the Greater Boston Interfaith Organization,[137] that mobilize parents and community members to push for school improvement. These schools have higher attendance, test score performance, high school completion rates, and more students with aspirations of attending college.[138]

Unfortunately, family engagement remains elusive[139] and is at its lowest levels in high schools. A number of factors contribute to this problem. There is often a large social and cultural divide between parents and school leaders (including teachers) in American cities,[140] as well as longstanding mistrust and frustration.[141] One survey found that 70 percent of urban teachers hold negative beliefs about students and their families.[142] Parents and school staff often have different schedules, speak different languages, and disagree as to what constitutes adequate parental involvement.[143]

Parents face a changing landscape of schooling, with new tasks, like choosing schools, and expectations and leadership structures that differ substantially by school. Now, more than ever, parents need help to participate and participate well. States, districts, and schools need to do more to improve family and community engagement.

CHARACTERISTIC #5: PERSONALIZATION

Personalized relationships between students and caring adults are an essential element of high-performing schools. Personalization in these schools decreases the anonymity of students, generates buy-in from students, and creates reciprocity between students and adults in the school. Evidence has shown that in small schools in New York City, the more personalized nature of the environment has had a positive effect on graduation and attendance rates.[144] The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation's high school reform evaluation project also pointed to personalization as an essential attribute of successful small schools.[145]

However, personalization need not be a result of school size alone. Some large schools have created effective small learning communities (SLCs) that foster the personalized environment necessary for students to thrive. This happens through decreasing class sizes and creating small student cohorts through daily advisory periods. The same teacher often advises each cohort throughout the students' high school career, building strong relationships between adults and students and allowing for personalized interventions for each student.

Empirical studies point to a number of techniques to achieve personalization; all seek to achieve rich and consistent relationships between students and adults inside the school. While reorganizing a school to achieve these relationships may seem costly, schools that are successful at creating a personalized environment have found creative ways to make personalization cost-effective. This includes hiring more teaching staff and fewer administrators, having teachers take on dual roles like running advisories, creating interdisciplinary classes for longer periods of time while reducing course load per teacher, and creating common planning time to allow for teachers to work together to support individual students.[146,147]

In 2002, Hillsdale High School, a large comprehensive high school in San Mateo, California, embarked on a three-year plan to redesign its structure into three SLCs of 400 students each. Once considered by parents to be the worst school in the district, Hillsdale has increased student test scores each year since the redesign and in 2007 was recognized as a California Distinguished School.

Lead Principal Jeff Gilbert attributes much of the success of this reform to the personalized nature of the SLCs.[148] All teachers and administrators run advisories for small groups of students and academic teams of teachers share large groups of students for two years at a time.

Though this model is more expensive than the traditional structure, Principal Gilbert has been able to offset additional costs by having administrators share teaching duties, outsourcing elective classes to local community college professors, and asking some teachers to teach multiple subjects. Teachers at Hillsdale who were integral to helping make the move to SLCs have called the changed environment "a private school experience in a public school."[149] They also note that the students feel more connected to the school and that teachers are much more collaborative with individual students.

CHARACTERISTIC #6: SOCIOECONOMIC INTEGRATION

Unlike the five characteristics discussed in this chapter, SES integration is not a feature shared by most high-performing schools and is rare among schools in urban districts. Although some schools (of various types) have successfully served student bodies composed

overwhelmingly of disadvantaged students, many others would benefit from the positive impacts associated with socioeconomic integration. We include SES integration in this chapter as an aspirational shared characteristic; one that research suggests would improve outcomes for low-income and minority students.

In his landmark 1966 study "Equality of Educational Opportunity," James Coleman explained that "children from a given family background, when put in schools of different social composition, will achieve at quite different levels."[150] He stated that both the socioeconomic status of students and other factors, like student aspirations, play a role in student achievement levels.[151]

Since then, a body of work has emerged to support Coleman's observations. A 2006 study from the Center for American Progress examining racial segregation in schools and related educational outcomes found that black and Hispanic students learn more in racially integrated schools and have better college attendance and employment outcomes. In general, schools with high concentrations of minority students produce lower learning gains for both black and Hispanic students, and that this relationship is largely due to poverty levels and peer achievement rather than racial composition.[152]

A similar 2002 study of fourth grade test scores in 60 elementary schools in Madison-Dane County, Wisconsin attempted to parse out the effect that SES has on student achievement levels and found that (a) socioeconomic makeup of a school was the main factor in accounting for performance on standardized tests, (b) low-income students' test scores increased as they were in school with more middle-income classmates, and (c) differences in a school's socioeconomic makeup had a more significant impact on low-income students than middle-income students.[153]

The findings show that decreasing concentrations of poverty, or at least increasing the number of middle-income students in a school, has a positive effect on test scores across various subjects for low-income students.[154]

Because good schools exist in many forms, district central offices should avoid the temptation to identify specific school types as "winners" or "losers." Instead, districts should focus on creating an environment that fosters the six effective school characteristics outlined in the previous section. The best way to achieve this goal is through what we—and others—have dubbed a "portfolio management strategy."[155]

A portfolio strategy reorients the district away from the traditional, top-down, compliance-focused school management approach and focuses on variety, autonomy, accountability, and choice:

- *Variety*: Allow many different school types, with various themes and instructional philosophies, to exist side-by-side within the district; central offices should not favor particular school operators (see *Authorizing Environment*).
- *Autonomy*: Delegate decision making on budgeting, scheduling, and hiring to principals and other school-level administrators; this will allow schools to meet site-specific needs and to experiment with innovative school design models.
- *Accountability*: Hold all schools in the district to common performance standards and be willing to close low-performing schools; in exchange for autonomy, principals and teachers should feel pressure to meet stringent improvement goals (see *Oversight Environment*).
- *Choice*: Further incentivize high academic performance and innovation through competition. Districts should allow all students as much choice as possible. Ideally, this would be done through open enrollment with no defaults (see *Choice Systems*).

A Helpful Metaphor for Portfolio Strategy: School Districts as Airports

In recent decades, large school districts have increasingly come to act, metaphorically, like they are both an airport operator and airline carriers. They feel it is their responsibility to provide the logistical services for air travel (district services like buses or payroll), while also operating all of the individual carriers (schools), right down to the flights.[156]

Anyone familiar with how a business operates would view this as inefficient at best—airports and airlines are two very separate, very different businesses. Logic would dictate the business of the airport (district) is best handled by one entity, while the business of the individual airline carrier (school) is best handled by another, separate entity.

Under a portfolio strategy, districts serve only as airport operators, rather than both airport operators and airline carriers.

Under this strategy, districts should take a hands-off approach to school management (in the same way as airports do not meddle in airlines' routing, price-setting, and customer service functions). Instead, the districts should focus on providing the logistical services and shared infrastructure—namely, human and physical capital—that allow *all* schools in the district to flourish (in the same way that airports provide air traffic control, terminal space, a centralized baggage claim area, and security).

This chapter will describe the most promising practices districts can use to implement this model.

Why Manage School Authorizing?

The first question a district pursuing a portfolio management strategy must answer is what type of schools should be in the portfolio. Every district oversees a stable of schools—including their employees and facilities—and thus will not be able to remake the K-12 educational landscape overnight. But in order to foster high performance, choice, and accountability, a district must maintain a diverse array of high-quality options and have a number of prospective school operators eager to get into the game should current providers falter.

Current Status

Many districts already perform a portfolio management role on a small scale as charter school authorizers. Indeed, 90 percent of the nearly 1,000 charter school authorizers across the country are "local education agencies," also known as school districts.[157] The rest are "alternative authorizers," including—in order of prevalence—regional educational entities, universities and colleges, state boards, commissioners and departments of education, other non-profit organizations, independent special-purpose charter boards, and, in a few cases, mayors and city councils.[158]

Though many researchers have hypothesized about the importance of authorizer type on school quality, results have been largely inconclusive.[159] However, a recent study by the CREDO found that states that allow *multiple* authorizers produce lower-achieving charter schools than ones that give chartering authority to local school districts exclusively.[160] This indicates that, if given a choice of authorizer, charter school applicants are adept at "shopping around" for the most lenient sponsor.

Evidence that charter school performance is highly variable (see *Charter Schools*) prompted the National Association of Charter School Authorizers (NACSA) to ratify the first annual "Principles & Standards for Quality Charter School Authorizing" in 2004. This report, which has been updated and republished every year since, signaled the beginning of a new era in charter school authorizing—one marked by a growing consensus that charters should only be granted to deserving and closely scrutinized applicants.[161]

NACSA's "Principles & Standards for Quality Charter School Authorizing" provides technical guidance on:

- Length of the charter (five years recommended)
- Application design
- Application deadlines
- In-person interviews with applicants (strongly recommended)
- Special attention for first-time applicants (strongly recommended)
- Student selection process—to ensure fairness and transparency, NACSA recommends random assignment, broad outreach to prospective students, including English language learners and those with individualized education programs, and well-defined discipline policies (i.e., no counseling out)
- Contracting with charter management organizations and other third parties
- Charter governance and financial management

The new rigor embodied in these best practices has resulted in some improvements in charter school quality.[162] However, many authorizers do not closely follow these guidelines. Analysis by the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools (NAPCS) shows that ten states score zero out of four on two or more "essential components" of a strong authorizing

environment.[163] And NACSA's own analysis—which distills 12 essential authorizing practices from its "Principles & Standards" report—shows that 14 authorizers, out of a very limited universe of those for which data was available (123 total), achieve fewer than half of the essential practices.[164]

Best Practices

Adapting these well-established and empirically grounded charter school authorizing best practices to apply to all schools under the district's purview is the first key to adopting a successful portfolio management strategy.

1. Identify quality providers and solicit applications. Some argue that authorizers should not be in the business of encouraging potential school operators to apply since it may jeopardize their independence when reviewing applications. However, experience has shown that market forces alone are often insufficient in attracting ample providers.[165]

In some cities (like Milwaukee, Philadelphia, and Washington DC), authorizers take an "arms-length" approach, leaving it up to independent, pro-charter organizations—or simply the initiative of prospective school operators—to help "build supply." In others (like Chicago and New York City), authorizers are more "hands-on."[166] In these activist districts, officials often provide more than just technical assistance on applications. Other offerings include "increases in funding, access to facilities…human resource training…clarifying and reducing regulatory requirements, actively soliciting and supporting especially promising potential providers, and risk sharing with providers, for example in special education."[167]

Districts can also help prospective school operators by clearly articulating what they are looking for in their request for proposal (RFP). Chicago and New Orleans have distinguished themselves by creating a standard RFP that clearly specifies the students and neighborhoods that will be served by the new school, the district's interest in certain instructional methods, if any, and the detailed criteria that will be used to score applications.[168] By clarifying expectations and establishing a transparent application process, districts can increase high-quality school supply.

2. Scrutinize applications. While most authorizers use the application process to scrutinize would-be charter school administrators and their plans for the school, there are examples of rubber-stamping. Districts and charter school authorizers must not fall into this trap, especially since closing schools is almost always costly, both financially and politically.

Predicting whether a prospective school operator will succeed or fail is immensely difficult, but some tactics have proven effective, including getting to know applicants better (both formally and informally), ensuring that no application categories are given short shrift, and allowing for revisions and resubmissions of application materials based on comments.[169] However, in the same way that mutual fund managers invest a small portion of their portfolios in high-risk, high-reward financial products, districts too should feel empowered to take risks on first-time school operators with innovative and promising ideas. Of course, the bulk of the district's school portfolio should be reserved for school operators and designs that have proven track records.

3. Resist inflexible caps or quotas. One hotly contested issue facing policymakers is whether or not to apply limits on the number of certain types of schools—especially charter schools—operating in certain jurisdictions. Caps that serve mostly political or ideological ends are counter-productive,[170] but "sophisticated caps" that allow for more unfettered growth in the number of a certain school type as the quality of those schools improves can be useful, especially for states and districts in the early stages of autonomous school experimentation.[171]

4. Hold authorizers accountable. Clearly, some authorizers are not doing their job. One way to combat this problem—given the evidence from CREDO described above—is to simply ban a state from having multiple charter school authorizers.[172] This would be consistent with the portfolio strategy in its purest form, whereby schools in a geographic jurisdiction should be answering to the same entity and held to the same standard as the rest of the schools in the portfolio.

A more nuanced approach would be to force charter (or other autonomous) school applicants to go to the local school district first. If denied a charter there, the applicant could then enter an appeals process that would allow an independent board, or a county- or state-level educational entity to overrule the local district. Should these appeals bodies exercise their power to authorize, the new charter school would then be under their purview. The CREDO study found that an appeals process like the one described above is correlated with higher charter school achievement.[173]

To ensure prudent chartering at all levels, information on each authorizer's portfolio of schools should be made public. Increased transparency would make it easier to hold authorizers accountable for their approval and renewal decisions.[174]

Recommendations

1.1 Require all charter (and other autonomous) school applicants to first seek approval from the local school district before pursuing other authorization options.

1.2 Establish a statewide appeals process to ensure local authorizers are giving applicants fair treatment.[175] The appeals body could be the State Board of Education or a special independent body, or there could be more than one (e.g., a county education department followed by the state education department). The appeals body's powers should be limited to overturning flawed decisions on the local level, so that local knowledge and preferences can prevail in all other circumstances. Should the appeals body exercise its power to authorize, the new charter school would then be under its purview.

1.3 Incentivize all charter school authorizers to follow NACSA's "Principles & Standards for Quality Charter School Authorizing." Ensure authorizer funding is sufficient for this purpose.

1.4 Mandate all charter school authorizers to make information on their school portfolio—including statistics on acceptance and renewal decisions—available to the public.[176]

1.5 Place "sophisticated caps" on new school types to ensure that growth does not outpace quality controls.

Why Manage School Oversight?

In a portfolio district—where all school types are afforded at least some degree of autonomy—effective accountability mechanisms are vital. Indeed, this is one of the key functions of the district office under the portfolio approach.

In the world of charters, research has shown that oversight matters a great deal in ensuring a healthy stock of high-quality charter school options. In part, this is because students and parents "vote with their feet" less frequently than had been expected when the charter idea was first advanced. Indeed, even under-performing charter schools rarely have a problem filling their seats.[177]

Districts pursuing a portfolio management strategy should expect a similar phenomenon. In the absence of naturally correcting market forces, districts must step in to ensure that charter and other autonomous schools are performing well enough to justify the continued flow of public funds.[178] Achieving this accountability without sacrificing school-level autonomy and innovation is the subject of this section.

Current Status

Unfortunately, many charter school overseers have been asleep on the job.[179] Contracts with charter schools often fail to specify which performance metrics will be used to assess effectiveness.[180] Even when metrics are explicit, the consequences for failing to meet thresholds are often unclear, leading to confusion on both sides. In California, for example, performance-based contracts are not used at all. Greg Richmond, President and CEO of NACSA, has been an outspoken critic of this approach: "I am aware of no other agencies, organizations or individuals in the public or private sector that enter into multi-year, multi-million-dollar arrangements for services without a contract."[181] In California, 85 percent of charter schools reported sending student achievement data to their overseer, but only four percent said that the overseer "had ever requested specific actions or imposed sanctions in response."[182]

Proponents of the current authorization system argue that charters can be revoked or allowed to expire, but few are. Between the end of the 2010-2011 school year and the beginning of the 2011-2012 school year, about 150 charter schools nationwide closed their doors because of financial mismanagement, poor performance, or some other malfeasance.[183] However, more than 500 new charter schools opened over the same period, not to mention the more than 5,000 charter schools that continue to operate nationwide.[184] It is estimated that 84 percent of charters are extended when they come up for renewal.[185] And a recent report from the Center for Education Reform finds that 15 percent of all charters have closed "for cause" since 1992—mostly as a result of financial or operational mismanagement.[186]

Best Practices

Lessons can be learned from charter school regulators' mistakes. The key assumption underlying charter and other autonomous schools is that by allowing them the flexibility to operate independently from the district, these schools will innovate and flourish. An overly empowered oversight body could work to undo this popular characteristic of autonomous schools by wresting more control over management and requiring cumbersome reporting. Historically, this is how districts have pursued accountability (i.e., through detailed compliance requirements and micro-management).

Under the portfolio approach, districts should pursue a "new accountability" that emphasizes improved performance rather than process.[187]

Ideally, districts would strengthen their outcomes-based oversight by holding schools to robust central metrics and increase their technical assistance capabilities without infringing on schools' site-level autonomy.

1. Consistent and well-defined expectations. Including explicit performance standards in the charter or contract of autonomous schools is vital for establishing high expectations for school operators. It is equally important that all schools in a district are held to the same standards and are measured in the same way. Of course, context matters, and districts should allow a school's unique student population and neighborhood characteristics to play a role in the assessment.

2. Predictable and evidence-based decision-making. Charter renewal and revocation decisions should be predictable and based on sound evidence. The Charter School Quality Consortium (CSQM) and others have worked in recent years to reach a consensus on the best performance indicators, measures, metrics, and targets by which to judge charter schools.[188] CSQM's Consensus Panel recommended four "essential indicators of academic quality," including student achievement level (status), student progress over time (growth), post-secondary readiness and success, and student engagement.[189] Specific measures include basic, well-worn statistics like graduation rate and proficiency level and longitudinal growth on state assessments, but also less conventional metrics like truancy rate and post-secondary enrollment or employment one year after graduation.

CSQM's Consensus Panel also tackled operational quality, identifying the following three indicators: financial performance and sustainability, board performance and stewardship, and parent and community engagement. CSQM suggested a number of specific statistics to measure the achievement of these goals, including metrics of liquidity, percentage of all required filings that are complete, and satisfaction rates of students and parents, to name just a few.[190]

It makes sense for districts to adopt a balanced combination of these metrics based on their unique preferences and use them for schools in their portfolio.

3. Willingness to close schools and "exit strategies." For this "new accountability" approach to have any credibility, chronically under-performing schools simply must be closed. Closing a school is always a difficult decision fraught with logistical and political baggage. One way to make the process easier is to require all schools to prepare for their own demise right from the start. Like a pre-nuptial agreement, these "exit strategies" would outline exactly how the school closure would work (e.g., where to relocate students, what to do with the building and staff, etc.) should the district decide to pull the plug.[191]

Recommendations

2.1 Require all charter and other autonomous schools to enter into performance contracts with the district that outline the rights and responsibilities of each party and that make performance metrics and consequences clear.

2.2 Incentivize districts and charter authorizers to use the academic and operational metrics recommended by the Charter School Quality Consortium's National Consensus Panel when reviewing school performance. Outcomes-based goals should be preferred over process-based ones. For some smaller districts, this recommendation may be advanced by the state education agency's provision of data analysis resources.[192]

2.3 Require the district to have an "exit strategy" for each school in its portfolio; the district can then decide whether or not to pass the requirement on to each school. This will help organize and expedite the school closure process, should expectations not be met.

Why Employ Turnaround Strategies?

There are approximately 5,000 chronically low-performing schools whose student bodies are comprised of a majority of students who are minorities or low-income.[193] It is unrealistic to believe that all of these schools can be closed and replaced with autonomous schools operating in a high-accountability environment, as would be called for under a pure portfolio management strategy. In some cases, districts must instead take a more hands-on approach in an attempt to "turnaround" failing schools. Though some turnaround strategies are more promising than others—and these will be outlined below—there are far more examples of failed turnaround attempts than successful ones, so districts and states should proceed cautiously in this area.

Current Status

While the characteristics of effective schools are generally understood, it is far less clear how to turn an ineffective school into a successful one. Prior to the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), approximately 30 school districts across 22 states had sought to intervene in failing schools since 1989.[194] The subsequent results were mixed. A 2004 review of the 17 types of interventions that had taken place in schools prior to NCLB found that when considering a continuum of interventions, state and district officials rarely chose to implement moderate or strong interventions. These moderate-to-strong interventions often included practices that might disrupt the basic structure of the school through means such as extending the school day, curriculum overhaul, replacing the principal, or turning the school over to an outside operator.[195]

Currently, there are four major turnaround improvement models that are being implemented under the 2009 federal School Improvement Grants (SIG) initiative: turnaround, transformation, restart, and closure. The turnaround model requires replacing the principal and at least 50 percent of the staff. Transformation requires grantees to implement all four of the following: (1) develop teacher and leader effectiveness, (2) comprehensive instructional programs using student achievement data, (3) extend learning time and create community-oriented schools, and (4) provide operating flexibility and intensive support. Restart requires that a school be closed and reopened under the management of a charter school operator, a CMO, or an education management organization; closure requires that the entire school be closed and that students be transferred to other high-performing schools in the school district.[196]

In the first round of SIG, there were 843 grantees across the country, the majority being high schools, and schools with either high-poverty or majority minority student populations. Roughly 73 percent of SIG recipients selected transformation, the model that is easiest to implement.[197] In fact, transformation was the exclusive model in 15 states.[198] Only 21 percent of SIG schools chose turnaround, four percent chose restart, and two percent chose closure.[199]

The amount of research specifically focusing on the four interventions within turnaround is sparse. The majority of existing research addresses reforms that closely match the transformation option. That research, however, is mainly limited to theoretical work, case studies, and literature reviews.[200] The research most closely tied to the turnaround and restart options is that of school reconstitution. Under school reconstitution, the principal and often some or all of the staff is replaced. While there are more studies looking at this kind of intervention in Chicago, San Francisco, and Baltimore, the results and findings are still mixed.[201]

VALUE-ADDED ANALYSES AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ASSESSMENTS

Value-added modeling is particularly important for the measurement of school effectiveness. "Value-added" scores reflect how much of the observed change in a typical student's performance is attributable to the "value" that is added by attending a particular school, net other pre-existing influences. Implicit in "impact" is a contribution of value. A major limitation of the metrics delineated earlier is that they typically reflect achievement, regardless of whether that achievement can be attributed to the school or to incoming student characteristics.

Value-added is a measure of progress, but unlike NCLB's Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) measure, value-added modeling first adjusts for past performance before comparing schools to a standard. By statistically leveling the playing field, inferences can be made about the contributions to students' improvement.

Unfortunately, most of the standardized testing instruments used do not support value-added analysis and those that do are not widely employed, in part due to controversies surrounding their use. Critics tend to object to value-added assessments because of their potential for high-stakes applications, especially for teacher evaluation and pay. Yet, high-quality standardized assessments that permit school-level value-added analyses needn't be used in a high-stakes way that affects individual teachers or even schools. When used in combination with a variety of other data accumulated over many years, they can be valuable tools that provide educators and policymakers with information about the efficacy of different school models.

One such source of valuable data will be supplied by the Common Core State Standards assessements, currently in development by the two multi-state assessment consortia at a cost of $330 million. This is a wise investment, but one that could be strengthened. Evaluation of educational effectiveness would be vastly improved if a variety of assessments were available to serve the needs of different constituencies. A one-size-fits-all exam is necessary for "proving" impact (summative) but exams crafted to specific curricula or educational philosophies are necessary for "improving" impact (formative).

Assessment development is an expensive endeavor, but to place that $330 million in context, consider that $6 million was invested to turn around a single high school in Chicago. At that rate, an investment of even $1 billion would enable the turnaround of only eight percent of the estimated 2,000 drop-out factories in the United States. Powerful assessments, by contrast, have the potential to create alternatives for all students fated for failing schools by clarifying what institutional models and practices are most effective.

There are also very few studies examining the efficacy of school closure. Generally, only large urban school districts chose to implement the school closure option because small and midsize districts do not have the capacity to transfer students to other schools. Both Chicago and New York City have actively engaged in school closure, but students were sometimes not placed in significantly higher performing schools.[202] When they were, however, students tended to exhibit higher academic gains than those placed in schools similar to the school that was closed. In New York City, new schools were opened to provide better options for those students.[203] The new public high schools created were found to markedly improve the graduation prospects for many disadvantaged students.[204]

Best Practices

Although the research literature on turnaround is not extensive, when its findings are combined with related research there appear to be some elements that can lead to positive effects.

1. Flexibility in approach. The most successful approaches to school turnaround use multiple, coordinated strategies, which are revised over time. The use of a single type of intervention to remedy the challenges that face diverse group of schools is far too simplistic, given the complexities of school failure. Therefore, all interventions are not likely to

work equally well in all schools. Research shows that robust turnaround in chronically low-performing schools takes time and that generic interventions with rigid, pre-defined durations are unlikely to be successful.

2. Strategic planning. The effectiveness of any school turnaround strategy will depend heavily on the degree to which the problem is understood prior to the initiation of the intervention itself. Strategic planning has been shown to be an effective tool for all public schools, particularly low-performing ones, as it forces a careful reflection of each school's strengths and weaknesses, and its related goals. Strategic planning also allows for the ushering in of a strong and pervasive mission and culture in turnaround schools.

3. Unwavering focus on instruction. Teachers and staff must have an unwavering focus on providing high-quality, deep, and differentiated instruction. Components of school culture that prevent this goal must be removed within the turnaround strategy. Teachers also need to be supported with tools, expertise, evaluation and feedback, and structured collaboration time with colleagues. Additionally, nearly all turnaround schools suffer from low reading achievement, so a particular focus on literacy instruction is also pertinent.

4. Commitment to change. Teachers, staff, and the community must be committed to change and to the mission of the turnaround effort's work. This is one of the most critical factors to the success of turnaround efforts. A strong leader cannot turn around a school without inspiring staff to change the way they think about the expectations for their students and how to effectively engage them in learning on a daily basis. Even the best intervention strategies can fail to be effective if the mindset is only on compliance, rather really than shifting the culture of a school.

Recommendations

3.1 Craft a three-year statewide strategic framework specifically for school turnaround and based on a realistic pace of implementation and expectation of results. A measured approach can help ensure a high-quality implementation, and that states and school districts are able to provide the support necessary to see success.

3.2 Instruct the State Department of Education to be more deliberate and bold with the types of models approved for SIG applications. Stronger interventions have been effective in creating conditions that allow for implementing components observed in high-performing, high-poverty schools.

3.3 When an entire school district is failing, consider using a recovery model that brings alternative instructional delivery to persistently low-performing schools or failing school districts. The issues at some schools are simply beyond the capacity of the local school district to turn around. States can and should intervene to close some schools or turn them over to outside providers.

Why the Need Exists

As school-type diversity increases under a portfolio strategy, districts should expect student and parent demand to grow more variable as well. Some students and parents will be attracted to schools with distinct instructional styles or thematic foci, while others will value schools that are nearby or that offer certain extracurricular activities. Providing students and parents with school choice could lead to better fits between schools and students.

Ultimately, though, the amount of power given to students and their parents in deciding which schools they attend affects more than just student satisfaction level. It also determines the amount of market feedback the district and school operators receive on the relative popularity of certain schools. This feedback can be helpful to districts deciding which under-performing schools to close and to school operators deciding which school designs to mimic or which innovative practices to expand.

Current Status

Choice has long been a staple of the U.S. education system, and it is likely to expand. NCLB provides funding for a number of choice options including open enrollment districts, charter schools, and magnets.[205] Choice has also been growing nationwide in various forms. From 1999 to 2009, enrollment in public charter schools more than tripled from 340,000 to 1.4 million.[206] In 2000, 33 states reported they had more than 1,350 magnet schools.[207] Legislation mandating intra-district choice is on the books in 27 states.[208] Moreover, between 1993 and 2003 the share of students attending a public school other than their neighborhood school increased from 11 percent to 15.4 percent.[209]

Available Systems of Choice

Choice systems were initially instituted in response to federal court orders to desegregate school systems, and began with busing in urban areas. Today, choice mechanisms available to districts exist on a spectrum.

The Choice Continuum



Under a residential assignment model, which has been the traditional school assignment system in the U.S. for more than a century, students are assigned to a neighborhood school and local property taxes typically fund that school.[210] This system has been found to create large income segregation among students due to the segregated nature of America's residential neighborhoods, making location highly correlated to achievement differences between high-income and low-income students.[211]

Non-traditional schools, including magnets, vocational schools, small schools, schools within schools, and charters, are designed to offer families more choice and foster competition with traditional public schools. The increase in alternative schools has created the opportunity for choice while preserving neighborhood defaults for families who either elect not to choose or who do not receive admission to their alternative option. This approach is often referred to as "limited choice."

A slightly different form of limited choice is one in which families can apply to attend any (or most) schools in the district (alternative or traditional) but are still assigned to a neighborhood (default) school. NCLB adopted this type of intra-district choice through a

provision in the law which requires districts to provide any child attending a failing school with transportation to another school of his or her choosing.[212] This provision has come under criticism because many school districts cannot make good on this promise; there are not enough slots in the highest performing schools for all the eligible students who are interested. As a result, only one percent of students have taken advantage of this transfer option.[213]

Open enrollment districts require all students to choose a school and have no neighborhood default schools. In order to account for the imbalance in supply and demand for schools, open enrollment districts use a priority matching system to assign students to a school from those they have listed on their applications. Because some schools are oversubscribed, districts have to create priority procedures to account for excess demand. Each city that has implemented open enrollment must weigh their priorities–from increasing equity to improving social cohesion—in order to create a matching system that works to achieve their goals.

Finally, voucher systems provide the most extensive form of choice, providing a dollar amount to all students in a district that would follow them to any school to which they can gain admission, including private and parochial schools.[214]

Equity Concerns

Wealthy families with the means to incur the transaction costs of moving to a new school zone or with the financial ability to pay for private education have always been afforded choice. Formal choice mechanisms must aim to minimize inequity for those families that lack these advantages.

Any choice mechanism creates winners and losers; choice does not guarantee equity. The outcomes of choice are deeply dependent on how it is structured and implemented.[215] The ability of choice to create equity relies heavily on how the choice policy engages parents, and incorporates integration.[216]

Parent Engagement in the Process

Under any choice system, the best-prepared students with activist parents will find their way to the best schools.[217] For choice to be successful for all students, all students and parents must have articulated preferences and find a school that matches those preferences.[218] Factors affecting this articulation of preferences include availability of information and the ability of parents to choose effectively, which has been shown to differ based on parents' own educational backgrounds.[219] This can be problematic for districts, particularly in urban areas where parents with a diverse spectrum of languages, educational backgrounds, time, and social capital must help their children choose from a huge number of schools. As Amy Stuart Wells, a school choice expert and public school parent in New York City has put it: "It's true that our system may be fairer than one in which every child's educational fate is tied tightly to their parents' ability to buy or rent expensive real estate…But that is little consolation to the student whose parent can't get off work for school tours that decide their school choices."[220]

Integration

The ability of choice to affect socioeconomic, racial, and/or achievement integration raises further equity concerns. Like funding inequity, race-based educational stratification has historically been a result of housing stratification in the U.S.[221] The main argument from opponents of choice is that families will self-select into segregated schools.

Recent research on charter schools has demonstrated that while race does not play a role in parents' stated preferences, it can be a powerful predictor of the school the child eventually attends; students in the study tended to attend charter schools with the highest

concentration of their own racial or ethnic group.[222]

In open enrollment districts however, student assignment policies can be designed to encourage and improve socioeconomic and achievement integration. (Racial integration cannot be mandated.) Moreover, many urban districts already experience very high levels of (if not total) segregation.

Cost Concerns

The more sophisticated the choice system, the higher the costs. Choice districts will always require additional district staff to manage student assignment and will often face inefficiencies. New York City's pre-2003 choice system, for example, involved three rounds of selection, waiting lists, and multiple offers of admission. Even after all that, this system still left some students without a school placement.[223]

Districts who limit choice to charter schools can be negatively affected because charter schools operate parallel to the district. This often means they siphon funds away from district schools, which can create a deficit in the district's financing model.

What's more, even though there are fewer students in the district, many districts' infrastructures were initially designed with a certain number of students in mind. Financing for this infrastructure becomes substantially depleted when students leave district schools for charter schools. One education policymaker in California referred to this phenomenon as "hollowing out the district."[224]

Finally, choice systems require robust transportation and information systems. Transportation must accommodate all students who choose a school outside of walking distance. Perhaps the largest cost of choice, transportation can be debilitating for a district to afford and manage. Because information is such a crucial element of choice districts, managing the creation and distribution of effective and understandable materials for families can also be costly and burdensome for districts.

Arguments for a Parent Choice Model

Competition

Those in favor of choice argue that competition is good for the market of education and will reduce inefficiencies and improve outcomes for students.[225] When the system works it can lead to the closing of failing schools. Over several years leading up to 2009 New York City Schools Chancellor Joel Klein shut down nearly two dozen large high schools due to lack of demand, including South Shore High School, the least popular school in the city, and opened small themed schools in their place.[226] By forcing action on schools that fail to compete successfully for students, choice systems can work as a powerful tool for reform.

Of course, this system requires adequate oversight and an effective competitive environment for both choosers and non-choosers. Failing schools must be closed or dramatically overhauled so that non-choosers are not defaulted into the worst schools. Districts must invest in transportation for all students so as not to dis-incentivize choosing a school far from home. Parents and students must feel empowered to leave failing schools. The start-up costs for a new school to open must not be so high as to prevent quality actors from opening new schools, and not so low as to allow for any provider to open low-quality schools. Most importantly, information must be widely distributed and effectively communicated to parents to improve the chances that all students are able to make effective choices. In addition, school administrators must have access to information that can improve understanding about why enrollment is declining and what schools and programs are preferred.[227]

Experimentation

Choice should empower schools by making them compete for the best students. In choice districts the central office can spend more time and resources fostering competition, empowering school leaders, and managing the assignment of students. This type of limited regulation encourages innovation and entrepreneurship while increasing heterogeneity among schools.[228]

Arguments Against a Parent Choice Model

Draining motivated students from the highest need schools

Opponents argue that limited choice systems that include a default harm non-choosing students. These systems may cream high-achieving students and highly engaged families who opt in to the best schools, leaving weaker students in failing schools. The most effective way to combat this issue is to remove defaults and force all students to choose. Furthermore, districts should include non-discriminatory policies in their choice mechanism and information must be widely distributed to help parents make choices.

Increased segregation

Some choice systems can increase segregation because families will self-select into segregated schools. However, because many urban residential districts are already racially and socioeconomically segregated, there is mixed evidence as to whether choice will make this segregation worse.[229]

Lack of standardization

Opponents criticize the diversity that advocates celebrate, arguing that choice moves districts away from standardized curricula and teacher preparation and creates niche schools that do not offer an equal education to all students. Additionally, this can mean that not every child has access to the same opportunities such as an extensive choice of electives, music and art programs, and sports teams. However, this argument loses some of its persuasiveness as states and districts move away from input- and process-based evaluations and move toward assessment-based evaluations of schools—in which all schools are judged on student outcomes, rather than the process that led to those outcomes.

Decoupling of school from community

Open enrollment almost by definition creates a disconnect between the community a child lives in and the school he or she attends because that school is often outside of his or her neighborhood. While evidence has shown that choice increases parent engagement and buy-in,[230] some observers worry that residents without children will grow less politically supportive of the school system if schools no longer serve as de facto community centers, as many traditional neighborhood schools once did. Parents too can lament the community division created by choice. As one Boston parent put it, "It's not like we've got this great neighborhood feel…I think part of that is there's no school. There's no community."[231] One way districts can combat this problem is by reserving a certain number of seats in schools of choice for local students and by requiring schools to make some of their facility's space available for community.

STUDENT ASSIGNMENT MECHANISMS: NEW YORK CITY AND SAN FRANCISCO

How does student assignment work in open enrollment districts? This depends heavily on how districts design their assignment mechanism and what goals they have in mind when implementing choice. In all of the open enrollment districts we examined, every student was required to choose (at least at one grade level during their academic career) but no one was guaranteed the school of their choice. Below is a brief look at how choice works in two of the large open enrollment districts we visited.

NYC: *redesigned in 2003 to include a matching algorithm by Harvard economist Al Roth*[232,233]

- The city is divided into districts.
- Elementary students are zoned to neighborhood schools within their districts, but can apply for charter and independent schools.
- Middle school students' choice is dependent upon their district within the city – some are choice and some are zoned.
- All high school students in NYC must participate in the application process.
- Student preference is ranked based on a combination of siblings, walk-zone preferences, and a random lottery number.
- Students are then matched to their first-choice school; if their first choice school is filled with higher-priority students, the unmatched student is moved to their second-choice school.
- 200 schools are given the ability to rank students based on test scores, and can express their priorities for applicants for half their seats.
- Some high schools require testing, auditions, or other pre-admissions activities.
- The directory of the New York City Public High Schools 2011-2012 is 504 pages long.[234]

San Francisco: *redesigned choice system for implementation in fall 2011*[235,236]

- Elementary and middle school students are assigned to an attendance area school.
- Elementary and high school students are required to apply to a school. Elementary students must list their attendance area school on their application if they are interested in attending it.
- Assignments to middle schools are based on the elementary school the child attends.
- The priority matching model includes assignment preferences for students with siblings at the school, students who attended pre-K in the attendance area, students who live in an area of the city with the lowest test scores (determined by Census tracts), and then students who live in the attendance area of the school.
- If there is still oversubscription for a school after preferences are given, ties are resolved by random lottery.
- Students who are not given one of their choices are offered a spot at the school closest to their home with openings.
- SFUSD has created an Interactive School Selector on their website to help parents with the school choice process.

Best Practices

Choice, when implemented correctly, is an entirely "different model of public school governance, one featuring an entrepreneurial system of schools run by a range of organizations vying for students under a fair and efficient system for matching students to schools."[237] In order to achieve success under choice, several conditions must be met.

1. Encourage districts to pursue an open enrollment system that requires all K-12 students in the district to choose and ensure fairness in funding and assignment mechanisms. Successful choice systems focus on equity and efficiency. New systems in Boston and New York City that require everyone to participate in the choice process and do not include neighborhood defaults have shown positive outcomes in the form of increased graduation rates and numerous school closures due to lack of demand.[238] Many open enrollment districts use a priority matching system to manage demand, though each city's mechanism is nuanced. In the priority matching system, students list their school preferences and are assigned based on demand for each school. Because some schools are oversubscribed, districts have to create priority procedures to account for excess demand. Choice, therefore, creates conflict between the preference profile of the student and the priority orders of schools.[239] The assignment mechanism must take into account equity, by including placement priorities for traditionally disadvantaged students, for example, to achieve success. Examples from New York City and Boston show that when choice can maximize expressed student preferences and equity in distribution, the entire district will be more successful and the assignment system more fair.[240,241]

2. Ensure that districts have ample resources for sharing accessible and easily understandable information with all parents. Studies have shown that on average families rarely have access to good information and, even though the lowest income groups typically have the least information, the difference between socioeconomic classes, races, or family educational backgrounds is not large.[242] Nonetheless, information sharing efforts should focus on the lowest income families with the least social capital.

Parent groups in San Francisco are given city resources to go into schools and communities to talk to parents about the choice system and how to choose a school for their child.[243] In New York City, the report card system focuses on simple and easy to access information about school performance. Even in New York, though, information sharing has much room for improvement. In their recent review of choice districts, the Brookings Institution rated New York City as top in the country, but gave it a failing score for "accessible online information."[244]

Districts must improve how they publicize the different resources that are available for special education and English language learners in different schools. This has been particularly problematic in large districts with many schools all offering different services. According to analysis by The New School's Center for New York City Affairs, "The high school directory [in New York City] offers only a bare-bones description of the special services that each school offers, and even those listings are typically out of date."[245] Guidance counseling services need to be improved and increased to ensure that all students have a supportive adult assisting them in the process.[246]

3. Continue to focus on improving under-performing schools. While choice improves the odds that a student previously assigned to attend a failing school can attend a better school, a choice system alone cannot improve the quality of teaching inside classrooms. However, choice can help focus attention on school quality and help districts to identify, and in some cases close, the worst schools.

Recommendations

4.1 Encourage districts to pursue an open enrollment system that requires all K-12 students to choose a school. Ensure fairness in funding and assignment mechanisms.

4.2 Ensure that districts have ample resources for sharing accessible and easy to understand information with all parents.

4.3 Continue to focus on improving under-performing schools.

SCHOOL FUNDING

Over $600 billion dollars is spent annually on elementary and secondary education, approximately 90 percent of which comes from government sources.[247] As Bill Gates, head of the largest philanthropic organization in the U.S., explains, "all the philanthropy that's ever been spent on this space is not going to add up to $10 billion. So it's truly a rounding error."[248] While private donations attract attention and can affect education spending at the margins, the primary challenge states face is distributing public funds effectively.

Today, there is an ongoing debate over whether different types of schools receive adequate or equitable funding. This debate frequently focuses on charter schools in comparison to traditional public schools. Unfortunately, any hope for a clear resolution to this debate is often obscured by differing methods of estimating funding dispersals to individual schools. In fact, estimates of funding deficits for charter schools as compared to traditional public schools have ranged from 21.7 percent[249]to six percent.[250] The most commonly cited, and agreed upon, deficit is in facilities funding (see *Physical Capital*).

Where a funding gap occurs, the ability of individual charter schools to raise funds privately varies substantially and has created a significant constraint on growth for some highly successful charter networks.[251] If private funding is already a barrier to the expansion of successful schools when charter schools represent only five percent of schools in the nation[252]—with successful charters representing an even smaller portion—then it is readily apparent that private funding is not a feasible or sustainable method of supplementing institutionalized budget gaps for many non-traditional public schools.

Additionally, funding problems are not limited to concerns regarding the total dollar amount available. The inflexibility of funding disbursements to traditional public schools can severely limit school leaders' ability to foster the six shared characteristics of high-performing schools identified earlier in this report. Furthermore, a lack of predictability or stability in funding can hinder schools' abilities to function even if they ultimately receive adequate amounts.[253]

One promising funding method that alleviates many of these issues is student-based funding, wherein a lump sum covering all expenses including operations, facilities, transportation, and so forth follows individual students (often in varying amounts based on student need). Individual principals then have the authority to spend those amounts as is appropriate for the specific needs and priorities of their school. Student-based funding also provides an avenue for states and districts to shift the focus away from the central office, which is often heavy with overhead expenses and staff salaries, and onto the individual schools. This change of focus, in turn, alleviates external pressure built

up from the current economic and fiscal downturn to downsize districts and provide greater transparency.[254]

By applying student-based funding uniformly across all public schools, regardless of governance model, districts managing a diverse portfolio of schools can ensure equitable funding district-wide while simultaneously making gains in the efficient application of these funds to best improve student outcomes. Furthermore, when coupled with school choice mechanisms, student-based funding can enhance the competitive dynamic between schools. Funding students, not programs, increases the budget for desirable schools to expand and removes funds from undesirable schools that are shrinking in enrollment.[255]

Equal per-pupil funding has been shown to reduce the inequalities of educational opportunity in many districts.[256] This funding mechanism is similar to the way that charter schools are currently funded, where funding is dependent on enrollment. This mechanism also differs dramatically from vouchers because the school district remains an oversight and regulating body.[257]

Oakland and San Francisco have both moved to a student-based funding policy that provides funding to each school based on weighted student need and gives schools autonomy over budgeting decisions. Both districts seek input from school staff, central office staff, parents, and community members. While the implementation of the policy differs between the districts, especially among specific funding parameters, evidence shows that beyond meeting the initial goal of improving funding equity, student-based funding has created an opportunity to improve other problems in the district and allowed for school-level innovations to flourish.[258] Similarly, in Baltimore, where student-based funding is also already a reality, principals finally "have a sense that they're empowered to make decisions that make sense…"[259]

Unfortunately, equitable funding across existing schools does not necessarily alleviate the unique problems that start-up schools face. There are certain fixed costs that any school, regardless of size, faces. Even a new school with only one or two grades of students must pay salaries for certain non-classroom staff such as a principal or school nurse. Additionally, these schools must also pay for a school facility and the accompanying costs of furnishing and supplying the facility before the first student enters a school. Therefore, it is essential for states and districts to develop a funding method that allows new high-quality schools to be established. Idaho, for example, has begun addressing this issue by granting 25 percent of its per-pupil funding to start-up schools based on their anticipated attendance upon opening.[260] Meanwhile, some districts, like New York City, offer specific supplemental funding targeted at start-up expenses for new schools.[261]

Recommendations

Encourage student-based funding in all local districts by offering districts increased flexibility in their use of state funds if they implement a system that includes:

5.1 The uniform application of budgeting rules across all schools in the portfolio.

5.2 Clear formulas for funding to follow individual students with appropriate funding weights applied based on student need.

5.3 Consistency in year-to-year funding through multi-year funding guarantees based on current student populations or other reasonable measures.

5.4 Targeted supplemental funding for start-up schools.

A large amount of most school districts' budgets is consumed by the "people component" of schools, also known as human capital. Not limited to salaries and wages, human capital includes funds spent on benefits, staff recruitment, and professional development, among other expenses.

Human capital is money-intensive: Approximately 85 percent of school and district budgets are spent on salaries and benefits, meaning that the development of this human capital by school and district leaders determines to a large extent the success of that school or district.[262] Therefore, it makes sense that addressing the challenges of a portfolio district must include a strategic approach to human capital.

Unfortunately, most districts do not currently address human capital in a proactive fashion: "In order to accomplish current education goals to educate all children, and especially low-income and minority children, to world-class performance standards, schools need talented and well-prepared teachers and leaders. But the current system doesn't recruit, train, hire, induct, deploy, develop, retain, or strategically manage the top talent needed to accomplish these goals."[263] What is needed, then, is a paradigm shift in the way schools, school districts, and other educational organizations approach human capital.

Researchers from the Consortium for Policy Research in Education at the University of Wisconsin-Madison offer a model referred to as "strategic human resource management," which centers on a basic premise that human capital has the potential to make direct, bottom-line contributions to organizational effectiveness. This is generally considered a departure from the more traditional view of human resource management as consisting of transactional, administrative, and legalistic routines.[264]

Strategic human resource management should include the following:[265]

- Acquisition, development, and retention of talent that flows from the education system's improvement strategy.
- Aggressive and comprehensive strategies to recruit—from whatever talent channel—top teaching and leadership talent into schools and districts.
- Professionally-managed teacher talent in classrooms to produce content-rich, effective instructional practices that boost student learning to high levels.
- Recruitment, selection, staffing, induction/mentoring, professional development, performance management/evaluation, and compensation that is aligned to multiple measures of teaching effectiveness.
- Professional school culture that is characterized by high expectations for student achievement, a common vision of effective instruction, and accountability for student performance results, as developed by designing and implementing both the improvement strategy and the human capital management program.

Moreover, schools need a constant supply of new teachers and leaders to expand, which requires robust recruitment and retention efforts. The best charters work to maximize existing teacher recruitment pipelines by maintaining networks with local education schools or community groups[266] and utilizing alternative sources like Teach For America, The New Teacher Project, and New Leaders For New Schools. However, these sources are inadequate to meet demand.[267]

To address this shortcoming, some charter schools have developed internal teacher training programs that provide extensive support for novice teachers (e.g., YES Prep) or that have the ability to grant masters degrees (e.g., High Tech High).[268] At least one of these programs (Relay Graduate School of Education) has grown into an independent graduate school of education specifically designed to prepare new teachers in underserved communities through a practical degree that they can obtain while teaching full time.[269]

However, many public school districts' teacher development programs are ineffective, stagnating, or in decline: "The opportunities for teachers to engage in sustained professional learning and collaboration have actually declined in the last decade."[270]

Teachers continue to rate increasing professional development in the content of their subject matter as their top priority for further training. Teachers receive less than eight hours of training a year on any given topic.[271]

Principal recruitment represents a similar challenge for schools due to inadequate existing pipelines. Pipelines are needed that train principals who both have a dedication to mission and the broad ranging skill set necessary to run a school.[272] Internal principal training programs tend to be less robust than teacher training programs, but certain models are promising. KIPP has a nationally recognized internal fellowship program run through its foundation,[273] and Uncommon Schools has a similar program that takes the additional step of training instructional leaders and operations leaders separately so that each job is more manageable.[274] There are also some principal training programs, such as New Leaders for New Schools, that provide a pipeline of leadership talent, but their scale remains insufficient to meet demand.[275]

Strong leadership is especially important for the success of a school turnaround, as the biggest challenges often lie in navigating the complexities of implementing multiple interventions. School leaders engaged in this work must be adept at using data, garnering teacher support, maintaining a focus on instruction, managing resources, fostering innovation, and engaging parents, guardians, and communities in their turnaround efforts. Currently, there are not enough school leaders equipped with the knowledge and expertise to succeed at this task.

Retention issues exacerbate problems that schools have with recruiting staff. This is a particularly acute problem for charters: by one measure, teacher turnover in charter schools is 25 percent compared to 14 percent in district schools[276] while 71 percent of charter principals plan to leave their roles in the next five years.[277] This turnover makes it difficult to maintain culture, adds recruitment and training costs, and means that charters are disproportionately losing effective experienced teachers and replacing them with novices.[278] Some of these issues are likely systemic in that turnover is higher among teachers serving impoverished students [279] and among young, uncertified, teachers,[280] which are both characterizations that are disproportionately true of charter teachers. However, high workloads can cause burnout and charter teachers[281] and principals[282] are both known to work substantially longer hours than their traditional public school counterparts.

Promising methods for reducing teacher turnover include flexible hours, on-site daycare, time off for mental health and increased voice through input on classes and other activities.[283] Increasing teacher voice through a system of more distributed oversight that allows principals to delegate tasks to strong teachers has also been demonstrated to reduce the burden on principals.[284]

Recommendations

6.1 Provide districts with incentives (such as competitive funds like Race to the Top or state funds flexibility) to develop human capital pipelines that aggressively recruit, thoroughly develop, and successfully retain top teaching and leadership talent into schools and districts.

6.2 Work with districts and other partners (e.g., graduate schools of education) to develop intensive school leadership training institutes and professional development systems that effectively improve teacher and administrator talent.

6.3 Incentivize districts to offer high-paying multi-year bonuses and/or contracts to high-quality school leaders and teachers to retain them in high-need schools.

6.4 Work with districts to foster district and school cultures that are conducive to employees maintaining proper work-life balances. Possible practices include mentoring, flexible hours, time off for mental health, on-site day care, and opportunities for teachers to voice feedback with administration.

PHYSICAL CAPITAL

As was established in the metaphor introduced above, districts pursuing a portfolio strategy are like airport operators—committed to creating effective schools not through direct, micro-management but rather by establishing an environment that fosters innovation and excellence. One way to build such an environment is through the sound management of shared physical capital. All school types should have access to the same caliber of facilities and all schools should benefit from the economies of scale achieved by district-level management of physical assets.

Schools without adequate facilities support have been forced to dedicate as much as a third of their operating funds to facilities financing[285] or be relegated to inadequate spaces such as church basements.[286] While facilities support can come in a variety of forms—direct funding, access to bond financing and government guarantees, or offers of shared space—schools in many districts do not currently benefit from any form of facilities support.

Direct facilities funding is only available to charter schools in 15 states today[287] and, even among these schools, the per-pupil amounts are frequently inadequate.[288] If districts apply a student-based funding model with facilities funding included in the per-pupil budget allocation, such as the model discussed in the *School Funding* section of this report, issues of inequities in ongoing funding for new schools would be largely alleviated.

Unfortunately, even if schools have funds available to pay for facilities, schools that operate outside of direct district management are frequently at a disadvantage in capital markets. Because these schools rarely have direct access to low-cost bond financing—fewer than eight percent of charter schools have accessed the bond market for their permanent facility financing needs[289]—they are forced to pay substantially higher interest rates than those faced by traditional public schools. This discrepancy is the result of the perceived risk of lending to a school that is not backed by a local tax base; this type of school can have a risk profile that more closely resembles a private venture start-up than a traditional public school.[290]

Some states have reduced these financing cost issues using models that could be applied more broadly. For example, Massachusetts has allowed charter schools access to bond financing through a statewide conduit, the Massachusetts Development Finance Agency.[291] Michigan grants similar bonding authority and goes a step further by guaranteeing these loans with money from the state's per-pupil aid account and a specially earmarked reserve fund.[292]

Beyond offering facilities financing and access to affordable credit markets to allow new schools to construct or lease private facilities, states can help new schools to use existing vacant district school space—entire buildings or portions of underutilized buildings. Unfortunately, this model of school siting remains relatively rare today despite the availability of such space in many districts.

Observers often blame the lack of district space for charter schools on the fact that most charter laws simply allow, rather than require, districts to house charters. Given that many districts have strong reservations about housing charter schools in district space, and that there is often organized opposition from outside interest groups, it is not surprising that districts do not voluntarily offer space. Even in areas with laws incentivizing, or requiring, districts to house charter schools—including California, Washington D.C. and Denver—the rates of charter schools housed in district facilities have been quite low because districts find ways to circumvent the intent of these laws.[293]

States could move beyond coercive power to incentivize districts to offer space to charters by requiring that, if districts do shift to a student-based budgeting model, they require all schools—whether traditional, small, magnet, or charter—to buy back space from the district at the same lease rate. Such a system would incentivize districts to offer vacant space to charters for fiscal reasons and should reduce claims of unequal treatment for different types of schools, both of which should increase political support for shared space.

Where there is political support for charter schools sharing public space, rates of charters using district space are dramatically higher. For example, in New York City, where Mayor Michael Bloomberg has decided to actively support the hosting of charter schools in vacant or underutilized city-owned buildings, the majority of charter schools have opened in these types of spaces. Unfortunately, situations where charter schools co-locate with traditional public schools frequently lead to claims of inequitable treatment for traditional public school students, and these claims have led to protests and lawsuits.[294]

Recommendations

Use state legislation to enhance the adequacy and equity of facility access across all public schools through the following methods.

7.1 Grant schools access to low cost tax-exempt bond markets through a statewide conduit.

7.2 Guarantee school facility borrowing by offering intercepts of state per-pupil funding to repay loans, generating a reserve fund, or other similar mechanisms.

7.3 Require that districts charge all public schools for district space at a standardized lease rate and that underutilized space in existing buildings be made available to new or expanding schools.

The Politics of School Choice

The politics of school choice can be volatile and polarizing. The decentralization of public education, integral to the successful implementation of the portfolio strategy, often provokes passionate reactions fueled by data, ideology, historical context, personal experience, fear, and sometimes, misconceptions. Although there are many nuanced arguments about portfolio strategy, we find that there are a few distinguishable policy camps concerning this debate.

In one camp, we find a loose coalition of market theorists, social entrepreneurs, policy advocates, business groups, and a few religious organizations who believe that the status quo of the public education system is archaic, unaccountable, and failing. Members of this coalition believe that market-driven choice mechanisms will provide positive changes for individual students and families, as well as the public education system as a whole, by stimulating competition among schools for students and improving quality.[295] Schools that are consistently low-performing will be forced "out of business" due to under-enrollment.[296] In the end, they believe a choice system will provide a more streamlined and efficient system of public education, as parents and students choose schools that meet their needs.

In another camp, we find the public school establishment—teachers' unions, school administrators, a number of school boards, some liberal policy advocates, non-profits, and some academics. This camp is less optimistic about the ability of market-driven strategies to improve public education. They argue that the achievement gains as a result of choice are mixed and inconsistent. They also believe that a market system cannot effectively guard against inequities and that choice will only intensify achievement gaps and stratification within the public education system.[297] Moreover, members of this coalition characterize choice as a false silver bullet that will fail to address the multitude of issues and challenges facing public education today.

In addition to policy camps, we find parents—a very strong and diverse constituency—on both sides of the issue. Access to opportunity is a daily experience; where a parent stands in this choice debate depends on where their child sits.

From the perspective of parents whose students are trapped in failing or unsafe schools, despite the complexities and uncertainties of market-driven choice systems, the opportunity is usually considered to be worth the risk. In New York City, for example, there were approximately 114,932 charter school applications submitted for only 12,917 available seats for the 2011-12 school year.[298] District officials report that even when they announce a charter school closure for either academic performance or financial mismanagement, hundreds of parents are still asking, "How do I get my kid into another charter?"[299]

On the other hand, there are parents who oppose open enrollment style choice systems, believing in the notion that when you choose to live in a certain neighborhood, you enjoy certain entitlements in terms of schooling. One parent interviewed in Wake County, North Carolina, the largest school system in the state, said, "If I wanted my children to attend school with students who live in trailer parks or projects, I'd have moved next to one."[300]

Based on observational data, the public school establishment, combined with some parents, has been more successful in blocking the widespread proliferation of school choice. In districts that have open enrollment and a system based on market principles, teachers unions have still been successful in blocking or delaying the closure of public schools that had failed, as evidenced by under-enrollment.[301] Only six states—Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, and South Dakota—

require every school district to have an open enrollment policy with regard to public education.[302]

While the political challenges of implementing school choice will persist, there are strategies that states and districts can implement to successfully move ahead with the portfolio strategy and facilitate its acceptance by various constituencies.

The Pace of Reform

Urban education reforms frequently come tumbling one after the other, or even sometimes simultaneously.[303] One driver of this "policy churn" is the increase in turnover among urban school district superintendents and administrative staff that has occurred as expectations for public schools and public impatience has grown.[304]

Officials have political incentives to discontinue their predecessors' projects and start their own. Additionally, school officials are under pressure to produce results quickly and please the diverse constituencies involved in education.[305] The result is dizzying: one study found that the typical urban school district is pursuing 12 reform initiatives at the same time.[306]

State Boards of Education need to pursue coherent reforms that are fully implemented. Furthermore, these reforms must be implemented at a moderate-enough pace to allow leaders and teachers in all types of schools to maintain alignment of curriculum, instruction, and testing during the reform's execution. They should also allow time to gather community input and communicate data-driven policy changes to parents in order to mitigate backlash. State Boards should limit the rate at which they introduce new policies and standards, set longer terms for policy implementation, and lobby to have grants and other funding structured to reward completion.

Recommendations

8.1 Pursue coherent reforms that can be implemented at a moderate pace.

8.2 Encourage districts to invest in experienced and savvy communications staff and offer to make state public relations staff available for this purpose.

8.3 Require districts to involve parents and community members in policy changes regarding school development and closure.

CONCLUSION

Reforms focused on pursuing a single type of school have not succeeded at an adequate scale. Schools under all governance types have demonstrated a striking variance in performance. States and districts need to help their diverse collection of schools achieve the characteristics of effective public schools.

We recommend that State Boards of Education incentivize urban districts to pursue a portfolio strategy that fosters autonomy, accountability, and choice. Together, the portfolio management of schools combined with open enrollment choice systems form the best strategy for improvement, and the best way to achieve equity for students.

To help districts and states achieve excellence in the core functions of the "portfolio district" — authorizing new schools, monitoring existing schools, turning around or closing failing schools, designing equitable school choice and funding mechanisms, and managing shared human and physical capital—we recommend the following to State Boards of Education.

1. Authorizing new schools

1.1 Require all charter (and other autonomous) school applicants to first seek approval from the local school district before pursuing other authorization options.

1.2 Establish a statewide appeals process to ensure local authorizers are giving applicants fair treatment.

1.3 Incentivize all charter school authorizers to follow the National Association of Charter School Authorizers' "Principles & Standards for Quality Charter School Authorizing." Ensure authorizer funding is sufficient for this purpose.

1.4 Mandate all charter school authorizers to make information on their school portfolio—including statistics on acceptance and renewal decisions—available to the public.

1.5 Place "sophisticated caps" on new school types to ensure that growth does not outpace quality controls.

2. Monitoring existing schools

2.1 Require all charter and other autonomous schools to enter into performance contracts with the district that outline the rights and responsibilities of each party and that make performance metrics and consequences clear.

2.2 Incentivize districts and charter authorizers to use the academic and operational metrics recommended by the Charter School Quality Consortium's National Consensus Panel when reviewing school performance.

2.3 Require the district to have an "exit strategy" for each school in its portfolio should any school need to be closed.

3. Closing or turning around failing schools

3.1 Craft a three-year statewide strategic framework specifically for school turnaround, based on a realistic pace of implementation and expectation of results.

3.2 Instruct the State Department of Education to be more deliberate and bold with the types of models approved for School Improvement Grant applications.

3.3 When an entire school district is failing, consider using a recovery model that brings alternative instructional

delivery to persistently low-performing schools or failing school districts.

4. Designing the school choice mechanism

4.1 Encourage districts to pursue an open enrollment system that requires all K-12 students in the district to choose a school. Ensure fairness in assignment mechanisms.

4.2 Ensure districts have ample resources for sharing accessible and easy to understand information with all parents.

4.3 Continue to focus on improving failing schools.

5. Designing the school funding mechanism

5.1 Incentivize the uniform application of budgeting rules across all schools in the portfolio.

5.2 Encourage the use of clear formulas for funding to follow individual students with appropriate funding weights applied based on student need.

5.3 Incentivize consistency in year-to-year funding through multi-year funding guarantees based on current student populations or other reasonable measures.

5.4 Promote targeted supplemental funding for start-up schools.

6. Managing human capital

6.1 Provide districts with incentives to develop human capital pipelines.

6.2 Work with districts and other partners (e.g., graduate schools of education) to develop intensive school leadership training programs and professional development systems that effectively improve teacher and administrator talent.

6.3 Incentivize districts to offer high-paying multi-year bonuses and/or contracts to high-quality school leaders and teachers to retain them in high-need schools.

6.4 Work with districts to foster district and school cultures that are conducive to employees maintaining proper work-life balances.

7. Managing physical capital

7.1 Grant schools access to low cost tax-exempt bond markets through a statewide conduit.

7.2 Guarantee school facility borrowing by offering intercepts of state per-pupil funding to repay loans, generating a reserve fund, or other similar mechanisms.

7.3 Require that districts charge all public schools for district space at a standardized lease rate and that underutilized space in existing buildings be made available to new or expanding schools.

8. Attending to the politics and pace of reform

8.1 Pursue coherent reforms that can be implemented at a moderate pace.

8.2 Encourage districts to invest in experienced and savvy communications staff.

8.3 Require districts to involve parents and community members in policy changes regarding school development and closure.

REFERENCES

[1] Council of the Great City Schools, *Beating the Odds: Analysis of Student Performance on State Assessments and NAEP: Results from the 2009-10 School Year* (Washington, DC: Council of the Great City Schools, 2011).

[2] Paul E. Barton and Richard J. Coley, *The Black-White Achievement Gap When Progress Stopped* (Princeton, N.J.: Policy Information Report Educational Testing Service, 2010).

[3] A dropout factory is a school that has fewer than 60 percent of it freshman advance to the senior class, as defined in Robert Balfanz and Nettie Legters *Locating the Dropout Crisis* (Baltimore: Center for Research on the Education of Students Placed At Risk, 2004). www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report70.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[4] Balfanz and Legters, *Locating the Dropout Crisis*.

[5] U.S. Department of Education, "No Child Left Behind Executive Summary 2004," http://ed.gov/nclb/overview/intro/execsumm.html (accessed December 2011).

[6] Diane Ravitch, *The Death and Life of the Great American School System* (New York: Basic Books, 2010), 144.

[7] Diane Rado and Tara Malone, "High School Test Scores Fall to a New Low," *Chicago Tribune*, October 20, 2011.

[8]Penny Bender Sebring, et al., *The Essential Supports for School Improvement* (Chicago: Consortium on Chicago School Research, Research Report, September 2006): 5.

[9] Clara Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools* (New York: The Center for New York City Affairs at the New School, June 2009), 1.

[10] New Schools for Chicago, "History," www.newschoolsnow.org/about-us/our-history/ (accessed December 2011).

[11] Jason l. Riley, "Was the $5 Billion Worth It?" *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2011.

[12] Richard D. Kahlenberg, *The Agenda: Turnaround Schools That Work: Moving Beyond Separate but Equal* (New York: The Century Foundation, 2009):13.

[13] Stephanie Ebbert and Jenna Russell, "A Daily Diaspora, A Scattered Street," *Boston Globe*, June 12, 2011.

[14] *Ibid.*

[15] Council of the Great City Schools, *Beating the Odds: Analysis of Student Performance on State Assessments and NAEP: Results from the 2009-10 School Year.*

[16] McKinsey & Company, Social Sector Office, "The Economic Impact of the Achievement Gap in Americas Schools." (Washington, DC: McKinsey & Company, 2009).

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] United States General Accounting Office, *Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: School Finance: Per-Pupil Spending Differences between Selected Inner City and Suburban Schools Varied by Metropolitan Area* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2002).

[19] United States General Accounting Office, *Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: School Finance: Per-Pupil Spending Differences between Selected Inner City and Suburban Schools Varied by Metropolitan Area* (Washington, DC: GAO, 2002).

[20] *Ibid.*

[21] Boston Globe Editorial Board, "Let students stay near homes – but offer choice as needed," *Boston Globe*, December 14, 2011, http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2011/12/14/let-students-stay-near-homes-but-offer-choice-needed/cEOD12oXMK6TM4eP6pkRsN/story.html (accessed December 2011).

[22] *Learning Supports and Small Schools* (Los Angeles: Center for Mental Health in Los Angeles, 2009), http://smhp.psych.ucla.edu/pdfdocs/learningsupportssmallschools.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[23] Alain Jehlen and Cynthia Kopkowski, "Is Smaller Better?," *NEA Today*, February 2006, http://www.nea.org/home/12214.htm (accessed December 2011).

[24] *Learning Supports and Small Schools*, 4. **||** www.smallschoolsproject.org (accessed November 2011).

[25] Jehlen and Kopkowski, "Is Smaller Better?"

[26] The small schools movement is not unified and does not rely on a single model of reform. See: Valerie Lee and Douglas Ready, *Schools Within Schools: Possibilities and Pitfalls of High School Reform* (New York and London: Teachers College Press, 2007).

[27] Diane Ravitch, *The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education*. **||** Jason L. Riley, "Was the $5 Billion Worth It?" *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576461571362279948.html (accessed November 2011).

[28] Riley, "Was the $5 Billion Worth It?"

[29] Susan Sporte and Marisa de la Torre, *Chicago High School Redesign Initiative* (Chicago, IL: Consortium on Chicago School Research, 2010). http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/content/publications.php?pub_id=141 (accessed November 2011).

[30] Linda Darling-Hammond, *Redesigning High Schools: What Matters and What Works,* (Palo Alto, CA: School Redesign Network at Stanford University, 2002). www.srnleads.org/data/pdfs/10_features (accessed November 2011). **||** S. Skakrani, *A Big Idea: Smaller High Schools* (Education Policy Center at Michigan State University, 2008).

[31] Lee et al., *Schools Within Schools: Possibilities and Pitfalls of High School Reform.*

[32] *Evaluation of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's High School Grants Initiative: 2001-2005 Final Report* (Washington, D.C.: American Institutes for Research, 2006). www.gatesfoundation.org/learning/Documents/Year4EvaluationAIRSRI.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[33] Jehlen and Kopkowski, "Is Smaller Better?"

[34] *Ibid.*

[35] See a randomized, longitudinal study: James Kemple, *Career Academies: Long-Term Impacts on Labor Market Outcomes, Educational Attainment, and Transitions to Adulthood* (New York City, NY: MDRC, 2008). http://www.mdrc.org/publications/482/overview.html (accessed November 2011).

[36] Darling-Hammond, *Redesigning High Schools: What Matters and What Works.* **||** Skakrani, *A Big Idea: Smaller High Schools*.

[37] Lee et al., *Schools Within Schools: Possibilities and Pitfalls of High School Reform.*

[38] Lee et al., *Schools Within Schools,* 21. An example of this finding appears in AIR's 2006 evaluation of the Gates Initiative, which was based largely on survey data, site visits, and analyses of district data, rather than experimental design.

[39] Howard S. Bloom, Saskia Levy Thompson, and Rebecca Unterman, *Transforming the High School Experience* (New York City, NY: MDRC, 2010). www.mdrc.org/publications/560/full.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[40] *Ibid.*

[41] Clara Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools* (New York City: Center for New York City Affairs, The New School, 2009), as cited in Ravitch, *The Death and Life of the Great American School System.*

[42] Alexandra Cawthorne, *Weathering the Storm: Black Men in the Recession* (Washington DC: Center for American Progress, 2009). http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/pdf/black_men_recession.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[43] Kemple, *Career Academies*.

[44] Skakrani, *A Big Idea: Smaller High Schools.* **||** See, e.g., www.smallschoolsproject.org (accessed November 2011).

[45] Rosann Tung, Monique Oimette, and Jay Feldman, *How Are Boston Pilot Schools Students Faring? An Analysis of Student Demographics, Engagement, and Performance, 1998 – 2003* (Boston, MA: The Center for Collaborative Education, 2004). www.cce.org/pilots.faring.2004.pdf (accessed November 2011). **||** *Progress and Promise: Results from the Boston Polit Schools* (Boston, MA: The Center for Collaborative Education, 2006). http://www.ccebos.org/Progress_and_Promise.pdf (accessed November 2011). This study did not employ an experimental design.

[46] It is worth noting that Boston pilot schools exercised an unusually high amount of autonomy over resources.

[47] Ash Vasudeva, et al., *Oakland Unified School District New Small Schools Initiative Evaluation* (Palo Alto, CA: School Redesign Network at Stanford University, 2009). http://www.srnleads.org/resources/publications/ousd/ousd.html (accessed November 2011). **||** Lee et al., *Schools Within Schools: Possibilities and Pitfalls of High School Reform.* **||** *Evaluation of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's High School Grants Initiative.*

[48] Sporte and de la Torre, *Chicago High School Redesign Initiative*.

[49] Valerie Lee and Julia B. Smith, "High School Size: Which Works Best and For Whom?" *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis*, 19 no. 3 (1997). Note, however, that learning was more equitably distributed in smaller schools, even though average achievement was lower.

[50] Joan McRobbie, *Are Small Schools Better? School Size Considerations for Safety & Learning* (San Francisco, CA: WestEd Policy Brief, 2001). www.wested.org/online_pubs/po-01-03.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[51] Ravitch, *The Death and Life of the Great American School System.* || Jehlen and Kopkowski, "Is Smaller Better?"

[52] The prevalence of self-selection into small schools makes it difficult to evaluate most small themed schools or schools within schools. Self-selection can be countered only by random assignment to schools, but unfortunately that then does not enable measurement of the possible benefit of student engagement of a theme of his choice.

[53] Lee et al., *Schools Within Schools: Possibilities and Pitfalls of High School Reform.*

[54] *Ibid.*

[55] *Ibid.*

[56] Paula Evans, Head of School, Community Charter School of Cambridge, Personal Interview, November 4, 2011.

[57] *Learning Supports and Small Schools.*

[58] Jehlen and Kopkowski, "Is Smaller Better?"

[59] Barbara Kent Lawrence, et al., *Dollars and Sense: The Cost Effectiveness of Small Schools* (Cincinnati, OH: Knowledge Works Foundation, 2002). www.earlycolleges.org/Downloads/reslib79.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[60] Sporte and de la Torre, *Chicago High School Redesign Initiative*.

[61] *Creating Successful Magnet Schools Programs* (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Innovation and Improvement, 2004). http://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/magnet/index.html (accessed December 2011).

[62] Alex Sergienko, "How a Small City in the Pacific Northwest Invented Magnet Schools," *Education Next* (2005): 47.

[63] Peter Tice, et al., *Trends in the Use of School Choice 1993 to 2003* (U.S. Department of Education, 2006). http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2007045 (accessed December 2011).

[64] Mark C. Vopat, "Magnet Schools, Innate Talent and Social Justice" *Theory and Research in Education* 9(1) 59-72 (2011): 61.

[65] *Creating Successful Magnet Schools Programs*, 4.

[66] Vopat, "Magnet Schools, Innate Talent and Social Justice," 61.

[67] Vopat, "Magnet Schools, Innate Talent and Social Justice," 62.

[68] *Creating Successful Magnet Schools Programs*, 1.

[69] Adam Gamoran, "Student Achievement in Public Magnet, Public Comprehensive, and Private City High Schools," *Educational Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 18, no. 1 (1996): 1, 13.

[70] Eugene P. Adcock and Gary W. Phillips, *Accountability Evaluation of Magnet School Programs: A Value-Added Model Approach* (New Orleans: Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Educational Research Association, 2000). || Dale Ballou, Ellen Goldring, and Keke Liu, *Magnet Schools and Student Achievement* (New York: National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education, 2006).

[71] Richard D. Kahlenberg, *Turnaround Schools That Work: Moving Beyond Separate but Equal* (New York: The Century Foundation). http://tcf.org:8081/Plone/publications/2009/11/pb700 (accessed December 2011).

[72] Kahlenberg, *Turnaround Schools That Work*, 7.

[73] Kahlenberg, *Turnaround Schools That Work*, 10.

[74] Kahlenberg, *Turnaround Schools That Work*, 10-11.

[75] Robert Crosnoe, "Low-Income Students and the Socioeconomic Composition of Public High Schools," *American Sociological Review* 74 (2009): 709.

[76] Chen, "What is a Magnet School?"

[77] Victor Harbison, "Magnet Schools: More Harm Than Good?" *The New York Times*, February 10, 2009. http://kristof.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/10/magnet-schools-more-harm-than-good/ (accessed December 2011). || Grace Chen, "What is a Magnet School?" *Public School Review*, December 4, 2007. http://www.publicschoolreview.com/articles/2 (accessed December 2011).

[78] *Creating Successful Magnet Schools Programs*, 3.

[79] Kent John Chabotar, "Measuring the Costs of Magnet Schools," *Economics of Education Review* 8, no. 2 (1989): 169.

[80] Chabotar, "Measuring the Costs of Magnet Schools," 172-73.

[81] Chabotar, "Measuring the Costs of Magnet Schools," 175, 180.

[82] Chabotar, "Measuring the Costs of Magnet Schools," 179-80.

[83] Ellen Goldring and Claire Smrekar, "Magnet Schools and the Pursuit of Racial Balance," *Education and Urban Society* 33, no. 1 (2000): 29-30.

[84] *Progress and Promise: Results from the Boston Pilot Schools* (Boston, MA: Center for Collaborative Education, 2006), vii.

[85] Bethany Gross, *Inside Charter Schools: Unlocking Doors to Student Success* (Seattle, WA: National Charter School Research Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2011), 16-17. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ICS_Unlock_Feb11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[86] Julian Betts and Y. Emily Tang, *The Effect of Charter Schools on Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of the Literature* (Seattle, WA: National Charter School Research Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2011), 1. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_NCSRP_BettsTang_Oct11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[87] Joshua Furgeson et al, *Charter-School Management Organizations: Diverse Strategies and Diverse Student Impacts* (Seattle, WA: Mathematica Policy Research and the Center for Reinventing Public Education, 2011). http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/CMO_Final%20_Report_Nov11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[88] *Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2009), 6. http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[89] See CREDO Hoxby Debate http://credo.stanford.edu/research-reports.html (accessed December 2011).

[90] Julian Betts and Y. Emily Tang, *The Effect of Charter Schools on Achievement: A Meta-Analysis of the Literature* (Seattle, WA: National Charter School Research Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2011), 29-30. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_NCSRP_BettsTang_Oct11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[91] Susan Dynarski et al., *Charter Schools: A Report on Rethinking the Federal Role in Education* (Washington DC: Brown Center on Education Policy, Brookings Institution, 2010), 3. http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2010/1216_charter_schools/1216_charter_schools.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[92] *Charter School Performance in New York City* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, 2010), 5. http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/NYC%202009%20_CREDO.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[93] Caroline Hoxby, Sonali Murkarka and Jenny Kang, *How New York City's Charter Schools Affect Achievement* (Cambridge, MA: New York City Charter Schools Evaluation Project, 2009), IV8-IV9. http://www.nber.org/~schools/charterschoolseval/how_NYC_charter_schools_affect_achievement_sept2009 (accessed December 2001).

[94] Erica Frankenberg, Genevieve Siegel-Hawley and Jia Wang, *Choice without Equity: Charter School Segregation and the Need for Civil Rights Standards* (Los Angeles, CA: The Civil Rights Project/Proyecto Derechos Civiles, UCLA, 2010), 5.

[95] Gary Miron, Jessica Urschel and Nicholas Saxton, *What Makes KIPP Work? A Study of Student Characteristics, Attrition, and School Finance* (New York, NY: National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education at Teachers College/Columbia University and the Study Group on Educational Management Organizations at Western Michigan University, 2011), I. **| |** Christina Clark Tuttle, et al., *Student Characteristics and Achievement in 22 KIPP Middle Schools* (Washington DC: Mathematica Policy Research, 2010),xii. http://www.mathematica-mpr.com/publications/pdfs/education/kipp_fnlrpt.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[96] Susan Bowles Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston* (Boston, MA: American Institutes of Research for the Boston Foundation, 2010), 7. http://www.bostonfoundation.org/uploadedFiles/tbforg/Utility_Navigation/Multimedia_Library/Reports/AIR_TBF_Debate_ES.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[97] Caroline Hoxby, Sonali Murkarka and Jenny Kang, *How New York City's Charter Schools Affect Achievement* (Cambridge, MA: New York City Charter Schools Evaluation Project, 2009), vii. http://www.nber.org/~schools/charterschoolseval/how_NYC_charter_schools_affect_achievement_sept2009 (accessed December 2001).

[98] Gary Miron and Jessica Urschel, *Equal or Fair? A Study of Revenues and Expenditures in American Charter Schools* (Boulder, CO and Tempe, AZ: Education and the Public Interest Center & Education Policy Research Unit, 2010). http://nepc.colorado.edu/publication/charter-school-finance (accessed December 2011).

[99] *Comparing the Level of Public Support: Charter Schools versus Traditional Public Schools* (New York, NY: Independent Budget Office, New York City, 2010), 3. http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/charterschoolsfeb2010.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[100] Andrew Vanacore, "Spending Varies Widely at Charter Schools in New Orleans," *The Times-Picayune*, March 15, 2011. http://www.nola.com/education/index.ssf/2011/03/spending_varies_widely_at_char.html (accessed December 2011).

[101] Steve Mancini, *Statement by KIPP regarding report: 'What Makes KIPP Work?' by Dr. Gary Miron and colleagues at Western Michigan University* (San Francisco, CA: KIPP, 2011). http://www.kipp.org/files/dmfile/KIPP_statement_WMUreport_03_30_20112.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[102] *Comparing the Level of Public Support: Charter Schools versus Traditional Public Schools* (New York: Independent Budget Office, New York City, 2010), 3. http://www.ibo.nyc.ny.us/iboreports/charterschoolsfeb2010.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[103] Rose Drill-Peterson, Director of the Eastbank Collaborative of Charter Schools, Personal Interivew, November 3, 2011. http://www.eastbankcollaborative.com/ (accessed January 2012).

[104] "Educational Programs," Denver DSST Public Schools, http://dsstpublicschools.org/about-us/educational-programs/ (accessed December 2011).

[105] Peter Frumkin, Bruno V. Manno, and Nell Edgington, "For Charter Schools, Managing Mission is Crucial," *Education Week*, Vol. 31, Issue 04 (2011): 26-28. http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/09/21/04manno.h31.html?print=1 (accessed December 2011).

[106] *Ibid.*

[107] Peter Frumkin, Bruno V. Manno, and Nell Edgington, "For Charter Schools, Managing Mission is Crucial," *Education Week*, Vol. 31, Issue 04 (2011): 26-28.

[108] Neerav Kingsland, Chief Strategy Officer, New Schools for New Orleans, Personal Interview, November 2, 2011; http://newschoolsforneworleans.org/whatwedo.php (accessed January 2012).

[109] Beatriz Chu Clewell and Patricia B. Campbell, *Good Schools in Poor Neighborhoods: Defying Demographics, Achieving Success* (Washington D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2007), 109.

[110] Bethany Gross, *Unlocking Doors to Student Success* (Seattle, WA: National Charter School Research Project, 2011), 12. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ICS_Unlock_Feb11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[111] Karin Chenowith, *It's Being Done* (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2007).

[112] Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, ES18.

[113] Karin Chenowith, *It's Being Done* (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2007).

[114] Chenowith, *It's Being Done.* || Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and Into the Schools: Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, ES22.

[115] "Delivering on the Promise: How Missouri Can Grow Excellent, Accountable Public Charter Schools," National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, February 2011. || Sam Dillon, "Troubled Schools Mimicking Charters," *New York Times*, September 6, 2011: A16. || Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, 22.

[116] Philip Gleason, et al., *The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts: Final Report* (Washington, DC: National Center for Education Evaluation and Regional Assistance, Institute of Education Sciences. U.S. Department of Education, June 2010): xvii, 81.

[117] Dillon, "Troubled Schools Mimicking Charters,"A16.

[118] Bethany Gross, *Inside Charter Schools: Unlocking Doors to Student Success* (Seattle, WA: National Charter School Research Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2011), 16-17. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ICS_Unlock_Feb11.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[119] Chenowith, *It's Being Done.*

[120] *Ibid.*

[121] Dillon, "Troubled Schools Mimicking Charters,"A16. || Hoxby, Murkarka and Kang, *How New York City's Charter Schools Affect Achievement*, vii. || Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, 12.

[122] Gleason, et al., *The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts: Final Report,* 81.

[123] Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, 14.

[124] Chenowith, *It's Being Done.*.

[125] Penny Bender Sebring et al., *The Essential Supports for School Improvement* (Chicago: Consortium on Chicago School Research, Research Report, September 2006): 1-2.

[126] Daniel L. Duke, "Keys to Sustaining Successful School Turnarounds," *Educational Research Service* 24, no. 4 (2006): 26.

[127]For a generic version of this contract, see "Commitment to Excellence" at the KIPP website, http://www.kipp.org/about-kipp/five-pillars (accessed December 2011).

[128] Mark R. Warren, Karen L. Mapp, et al. *A Match on Dry Grass: Community Organizing as a Catalyst for School Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 6.

[129] Joanna Smith et al., "Parent Involvement in Urban Charter Schools: New Strategies for Increasing Participation," The School Community Journal, 21, No. 1 (2011): 72-73.

[130] William H. Jeynes, "A Meta-Analysis of the Relation of Parental Involvement to Urban Elementary School Student Academic Achievement," *Urban Education,* 40, No. 237 (2005): 258.

[131] Eva M. Pomerantz, et al., "The How, Whom, and Why of Parents' Involvement in Children's Academic Lives: More Is Not Always Better," *Review of Educational Research*, 77, No. 373, (2007): 393.

[132] Nancy E. Hill and Lorraine C. Taylor, "Parental School Involvement and Children's Academic Achievement: Pragmatics and Issues," *Current Directions in Psychological Science* 13, No. 161 (2004): 161.

[133] Pomerantz et al., "The How, Whom, and Why of Parents' Involvement in Children's Academic Lives: More Is Not Always Better," 379.

[134]Jeynes, "A Meta-Analysis of the Relation of Parental Involvement to Urban Elementary School Student Academic Achievement," 237.

[135] Melissa Marschall, "Parent involvement and educational outcomes for Latino students," *Review of Policy Research, 23, No.* 5 (2006): 1053-1075.

[136] For information on this organization and its work, see Mark R. Warren, Karen L. Mapp, et al. *A Match on Dry Grass: Community Organizing as a Catalyst for School Reform* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 99-134.

[137] Yusufi Vali, Community Organizer, Greater Boston Interfaith Organization, Personal Interview, November 3, 2011.

[138] Kavitha Mediratta, Seema Shah, and Sara McAlister, *Community Organizing for Stronger Schools: Strategies and Successes* (Cambridge: Harvard Education Press, 2009).

[139] Joanna Smith et al., "Parent Involvement in Urban Charter Schools: New Strategies for Increasing Participation," *The School Community Journal*, 21, no. 1 (2011): 73.

[140] Marian Keyes and Soleil Gregg, *School–community Connections: A Literature Review* (Charleston, WV: AEL Inc., 2001), 32.

[141] Pedro Noguera, "Transforming Urban Schools Through Investments in the Social Capital of Parents," in Mark Warren (Ed.), *Social capital* in *poor communities,* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).

[142] G. L. Thompson et al., "Its not my fault: Predicting high school teachers who blame parents and students for students' low achievement," *High School Journal*, 87, no. 3 (2004): 6, 8.

[143] Smith et al., "Parent Involvement in Urban Charter Schools: New Strategies for Increasing Participation," 73.

[144] Clara Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools* (New York City: Center for New York City Affairs, The New School, 2009), 35.

[145] The National Evaluation of High School Transformation, American Institutes for Research, and SRI International, *Evaluation of the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation's High School Grants Initiative: 2001-2005, Final Report* (Seattle, WA: The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2006), 3.

[146] Linda Darling-Hammond, *Redesigning Schools: What Matters and What Works 10 Features of Good Small Schools* (Stanford, CA: School Redesign Network at Stanford University, 2002), 6-7.

[147] Howard S. Bloom, Sasikia Levy Thompson, and Rebecca Unterman, *Transforming the High School Experience: How New York City's New Small Schools are Boosting Student Achievement and Graduation Rates* (New York City: MDRC, 2010), 9.

[148] Jeff Gilbert, Lead Principal, Hillsdale High School, Personal Interview, November 2, 2011.

[149] Greg Jouriles, Social Sciences teacher, Hillsdale High School, quoting Greg Lance, Personal Interview, November 2, 2011.

[150] James Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington: National Center for Education Statistics, 1966), 22. http://www.eric.ed.gov/PDFS/ED012275.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[151] Coleman, et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, 21-22.

[152] Harris, *Lost Learning, Forgotten Promises*, 17-18.

[153] David Rusk, *Classmates Count: A study of the interrelationship between socioeconomic background and standardized test scores of 4th grade pupils in the Madison-Dane County public schools* (2002), 2-3. www.schoolinfosystem.org/archives/Unifiedfinalreport.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[154] *Ibid.* While some decrease in scores was seen for middle-income students when there were more low-income students in a school, the study attributes this to the fact that in schools with more low-income students the income levels of the middle-income students tended to decrease, even though this group of students continued to be classified as coming from middle-income families.

[155] See, for example, "The 7 Components of a Portfolio Strategy" Portfolio School Districts Project, Center on Reinventing Public Education, December 2011. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/Brief_PSDP_Strategy_Dec11.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[156] Rob Stein, Senior Advisor for Leadership Development, Get Smart Schools, Personal Interview, November 2, 2011.

[157] 857 of 955 total charter authorizers in 2010-2011 school year (89.7%) were "school districts, or local education agencies (LEAs)." Source: *The State of Charter School Authorizing* (Chicago, IL: National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2010), 9-10. http://www.qualitycharters.org/images/stories/publications/2010_facts_report.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[158] Bryan Hassel, Todd Ziebarth and Lucy Steiner, "A State Policymaker's Guide to Alternative Authorizers of Charter Schools" *Education Commission of the States Issue Brief*, September 2005, 2. http://1.usa.gov/vlJKHQ (accessed November 2011).

[159] Ron Zimmer, Brian Gill and Kaitlin Obenauf, *Charter School Authorizers and Student Achievement* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, December 2010), 24. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/view/csr_pubs/379 (accessed December 2011). **| |** Louann Bierlein Palmer and Rebecca Gau, *Charter School Authorizing: Are States Making the Grade?* (Washington, DC: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, 2003), 1. http://publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/686_file_CharterAuthorizing_FullReport_20110402T222339.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[160] *Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States* (Stanford, CA: Center for Research on Education Outcomes, Stanford University, 2009), 40. http://credo.stanford.edu/reports/MULTIPLE_CHOICE_CREDO.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[161] In the early years of the charter school movement, charter school advocates pushed for state laws that allowed charters to be granted easily; now that low quality has become a widespread concern, even advocates have pushed for stricter standards.

[162] Meghan Squires and Lydia Rainey, *Finding a Balance: How Application and Authorization Policies Impact School Supply* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2008), 14-15.

[163] We selected six of the 20 components NAPCS identified as part of its 2009 report entitled "A New Model Law for Supporting the Growth of High-Quality Public Charter Schools." They are: (1) authorizer and overall program accountability system required by law; (2) adequate authorizer funding; (3) transparent charter application, review, and decision-making processes; (4) performance-based charter contracts required; (5) comprehensive charter school monitoring and data collection processes; and (6) clear processes for renewal, nonrenewal, and revocation decisions. The low performing states are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, New Jersey, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin. See: *How State Charter Laws Rank Against the New Model Public Charter School Law*, (Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2010). http://publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/DB-ModelLaw_Report_01-12-10_20110402T222332.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[164] *National Association of Charter School Authorizers' Index of Essential Practices* (Chicago, IL: National Association of Charter School Authorizers, 2011). http://www.qualitycharters.org/images/stories/publications/NACSA_2011_Index_of_Essential_Practices.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[165] Stephan B. Page and Katharine Destler, *Buying Smart in Thin Markets: District Tactics to Improve Quality and Quantity of Autonomous Schools* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2008), 3. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/wp_ncsrp3_thinmrk_may08.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[166] Katharine Destler, *Contrasting Approaches to Charter School Oversight* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2009), 5-12. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/wp_ncsrp_contrast_aug09.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[167] Robin J. Lake and Paul T. Hill, *Performance Management in Portfolio School Districts* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, National Charter School Research Project, 2009), 24. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/view/csr_pubs/291 (accessed December 2011).

[168] Lake and Hill, *Performance Management in Portfolio School Districts,* 34.

[169] Squires and Rainey, *Finding a Balance: How Application and Authorization Policies Impact School Supply.*

[170] Students in charter schools in states with charter caps perform 0.03 standard deviations lower than those in states with no cap; and in states almost at their cap, the effect is magnified. See: *Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States*, 40.

[171] Lisa M. Stulberg, *Beyond the Battle Lines: Lessons from New York's Charter Caps Fight* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, National Charter School Research Project, Center, 2007), 5-6. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ncsrp_battlelines_jun07.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[172] Despite the results of the CREDO study, Robin Lake argues that states should do just the opposite by encouraging multiple authorizers. This, she argues, would force districts hostile to charter schools to take their chartering responsibilities more seriously. See: Robin J. Lake, *Holding Charter Authorizers Accountable: Why it is Important and How it Might be Done* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, National Charter School Research Project, 2006), 7-8. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/whp_ncsrp_wp1auth_feb06.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[173] *Multiple Choice: Charter School Performance in 16 States*, 41.

[174] Lake, *Holding Charter Authorizers Accountable: Why it is Important and How it Might be Done*, 5.

[175] Lake, *Holding Charter Authorizers Accountable: Why it is Important and How it Might be Done*, 6.

[176] Bryan Hassel and Meghan Batdorff, *High Stakes: Findings from a National Study of Life-or-Death Decisions by Charter School Authorizers* (Chapel Hill, NC: Public Impact, 2004). Cited by Lake, *Holding Charter Authorizers Accountable: Why it is Important and How it Might be Done*, 5.

[177] Andrew Rotherham, "The Pros and Cons of Charter School Closures," in *Hopes, Fears, and Reality: A Balanced Look at American Charter Schools in 2005*, ed. Robin J. Lake and Paul T. Hill, (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2005), 43-52. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ch4_hfr05_dec05.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[178] Even if market forces were more robust (i.e., students and parents were more willing and able to leave one charter for another), at least some public sector oversight role would be justified because taxpayers' interests will not always match up directly with parents' and students' interests.

[179] Judith Powell, et al., "Evaluation of Charter School Effectiveness" (Menlo Park, CA: SRI International, 1997), S-5.

[180] Jane Hannaway, "Contracting as a Mechanism for Managing Education Services," Policy Brief No. RB-28 (Philadelphia, PA: Consortium for Policy Research in Education, 1999). http://www.cpre.org/contracting-mechanism-managing-education-services (accessed December 2011).

[181] *Smarter Choices, Better Education: Improving California Charter Schools* (Sacramento, CA: Little Hoover Commission, 2010), 52. http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/202/report202.html (accessed November 2011).

[182] Judith Powell, et al., "Evaluation of Charter School Effectiveness," III-22. http://policyweb.sri.com/cep/publications/SRI_CA_charter_schools_1997.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[183] *Back to School Tallies: Estimated Number of Public Charter Schools, 2011-2012* (Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2011), 1. http://publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/NAPCS%202011-12%20New%20and%20Closed%20Schools%20_20111104T141629.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[184] *Ibid.*

[185] Bryan Hassel and Meghan Batdorff, *High Stakes: Findings from a National Study of Life-or-Death Decisions by Charter School Authorizers*.

[186] Consoletti, Alison "The State of Charter Schools: What We Know—And What We Do Not—About Performance and Accountability" The Center for Education Reform, December 2011, Pages 7-8. http://www.edreform.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/StateOfCharterSchools_CER_Dec2011-Web-1.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[187] Lake and Hill, *Performance Management in Portfolio School Districts*,12-16, 46.

[188] The other groups working to this end include the Walton Family Foundation, New Schools Venture Fund, the Charter School Growth Fund, and the National Charter School Research Project's Charter School Achievement Consensus Panel.

[189] *Framework for Academic Quality* (National Consensus Panel on Charter School Academic Quality, 2008), 9. http://www.charterschoolquality.org/media/1186/FrameworkForAcademicQuality.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[190] *Framework for Operational Quality* (National Consensus Panel on Charter School Academic Quality, 2009), 4. http://www.charterschoolquality.org/media/1187/FrameworkForOperationalQuality.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[191] Rob Stein, Senior Advisor for Leadership Development, Get Smart Schools, Personal Interview, November 2, 2011.

[192] Lake and Hill, *Performance Management in Portfolio School Districts*, 33.

[193] Arne Duncan, "Turning Around the Bottom 5 Percent," As delivered at the National Alliance for Public Charter Schools Conference, June 22, 2009, http://www2.ed.gov/news/speeches/2009/06/06222009.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[194] Ronald Brady, *Can Failing Schools Be Fixed?* (Washington, DC: Thomas B. Fordham Foundation, 2003).

[195] *Ibid.*

[196] United States Department of Education, "School Improvement Grants" (Washington, DC: USDOE, 2011), http://1.usa.gov/tJjUR5 (accessed January 2012).

[197] United States Department of Education, *Baseline Analysis of SIG Applications and SIG-Eligible and SIG-Awarded Schools* (Washington, DC: USDOE, 2011). http://ies.ed.gov/ncee/pubs/20114019/ (accessed November 2011).

[198] Transformation requires each of the following be completed: (1) Develop teacher and leader effectiveness. (2) Comprehensive instructional programs using student achievement data. (3) Extend learning time and create community-oriented schools. (4) Provide operating flexibility and intensive support. The school is required to implement all four strategies.

[199] Padmini Jambulapati, "A Portrait of School Improvement Grantees," *Education Sector*, April 26, 2011. http://www.educationsector.org/publications/portrait-school-improvement-grantees (accessed November 2011).

[200] Joseph Murphy and Coby Meyers, *Turning around failing schools: Lessons from the organizational sciences* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Corwin Press, 2007). **| |** Geoffrey Borman, et al., *Four models of school improvement: Successes and challenges in reforming low- performing, high-poverty Title I schools*, no. 48 (Baltimore: Center for Research on the Education of Students Placed At Risk, 2000). www.csos.jhu.edu/crespar/techReports/Report48.pdf (accessed November 2011). **| |** Daniel Duke, et al., *Lift-off: Launching the school turnaround process in 10 Virginia schools*, (Charlottesville, VA: Darden/Curry Partnership for Leaders in Education, 2005).

[201] G. Alfred Hess, Jr., "Reconstitution—Three years later: Monitoring the effect of sanctions on Chicago high schools," *Education and Urban Society* 35, no. 3 (2003): 300-327. **| |** Betty Malen, et al., "Reconstituting schools: "Testing" the "theory of action," *Education Evaluation and Policy Analysis* 24, no. 2 (2002): 113-132. **| |** Jennifer King Rice and Betty Malen, "The Human Costs of Education Reform: The Case of School Reconstitution," *Educational Administration Quarterly* 39, no. 5 (2003): 635-666. **| |** Jennifer Goldstein, Matt Kelemen, and William Koski, "Reconstitution in Theory and Practice: The Experience of San Francisco," Paper Presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, San Diego, CA, April 2008 http://1.usa.gov/rwjA86 (accessed December 2011). **| |** Calkins et al, *The Turnaround Challenge* (Boston: Mass Insight Education & Research Institute, 2007) http://www.massinsight.org/publications/turnaround/51/file/1/pubs/2010/04/15/TheTurnaroundChallenge_MainReport.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[202] Marisa de la Torre and Julie Gwynne, *When schools close: Effects on displaced students in Chicago Public Schools* (Chicago: Consortium on Chicago School Research, 2009). http://ccsr.uchicago.edu/content/publications.php?pub_id=136 (accessed December 2011).

[203] Paul Hill, et al., *Portfolio school districts for big cities: An interim report* (Seattle, WA: Center on Reinventing Public Education, 2009). http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/view/csr_pubs/295 (accessed December 2011).

[204] Howard S. Bloom, et al, *Transforming the High School Experience How New York City's New Small Schools Are Boosting Student Achievement and Graduation Rates* (New York: MDRC, 2010). http://www.mdrc.org/publications/560/overview.html (accessed December 2011).

[205] Department of Education, *No Child Left Behind: Helping Families By Supporting and Expanding School Choice*.

[206] National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education: 2011*(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Education, 2011), 24.

[207] National Working Commission on Choice in K-12 Education, *Choice: Doing it the Right Way Makes a Difference*, 14.

[208] Umut Özek, *The Effects of Open Enrollment on School Choice and Student Outcomes* (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 2009), 1-2.

[209] *Ibid*.

[210] Jay Greene, et al., *Expanding Choice in Elementary and Secondary Education.* (Washington, D.C.: Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings, 2010), 7.

[211] Selcuk R. Sirin, "Socioeconomic Status and Academic Achievement: A Meta-Analytic Review of Research," *Review of Educational Research* 75, no 3 (2005): 420-1.

[212] Department of Education, *No Child Left Behind: Helping Families By Supporting and Expanding School Choice*, (Washington, DC, 2008), http://1.usa.gov/uKD5h1 (accessed December 2011).

[213] Greene, et al., *Expanding Choice in Elementary and Secondary Education*, 9.

[214] This report does not examine voucher programs, as that work has been done rigorously elsewhere, and is not the focus of our analysis.

[215] National Working Commission on Choice in K-12 Education, *Choice: Doing it the Right Way Makes a Difference* (Washington, DC: Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings, 2003), 4.

[216] Julian Betts and Tom Loveless, *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 13.

[217] Clara Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools* (New York City: Center for New York City Affairs, The New School, 2009), 6.

[218] Betts and Loveless, *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy*, 40-41.

[219] Betts and Loveless, *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy*, 45.

[220] Amy Stuart Wells, "School Choice? A Question of Time and Money," *The New York Times*, December 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/schoolbook/2011/12/05/school-choice-a-question-of-time-and-money/ (accessed December 2011).

[221] Betts and Loveless, *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy*, 133.

[222] Gregory R. Weiher and Kent L. Tedin, "Does Choice Lead to Racially Distinctive Schools? Charter Schools and Household Preferences," *Journal of Policy Analysis and Management* 21, no. 1 (2001): 91.

[223] Thomas Toch and Chad Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston* (Boston: Education Sector, 2009), 2-3.

[224] Lewis Cohen, Deputy Mayor of Oakland, CA, Personal Interview, November 3, 2011.

[225] Dan D. Goldhaber, "School Choice: An Examination of the Empirical Evidence on Achievement, Parental Decision Making, and Equity," *Educational Researcher* 9, no. 28 (1999): 16.

[226] Toch and Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston*, 5.

[227] Betts and Loveless, *Getting Choice Right: Ensuring Equity and Efficiency in Education Policy*, 120-125.

[228] National Working Commission on Choice in K-12 Education, *Choice: Doing it the Right Way Makes a Difference*, 5.

[229] National Working Commission on Choice in K-12 Education, *Choice: Doing it the Right Way Makes a Difference*, 22.

[230] Claire Smrekar, *The Impact of School Choice and Community: In the Interest of Families and Schools* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996), 8.

[231] Ebbert and Russell, "A Daily Diaspora, A Scattered Street."

[232] Toch and Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston*, 8.

[233] SchoolBook Editors, "Guide: Enrolling Your Child," *The New York Times*, September 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/schoolbook/guides/enrollment (accessed December 2011).

[234] New York City Department of Education, "Directory of the New York City Public High Schools 2011-2012," http://schools.nyc.gov/ChoicesEnrollment/High/Publications/default.htm#2011 (accessed December 2011).

[235] Parents for Public Schools, "Student Assignment System: SFUSD Application Process," http://www.ppssf.org/Enrollment/Assignment_enrollment.html (accessed December 2011).

[236] San Francisco Public Schools, "Student Placement Policy Effective for 2011-2012 School Year," http://www.sfusd.edu/en/enroll-in-sfusd-schools/enroll-for-next-year/placement/placement-policy.html (accessed December 2011).

[237] Toch and Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston*, 7.

[238] Toch and Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston,* 5-6.

[239] Onur Kesten, "School Choice with Consent," *Quarterly Journal of Economics* CXXV, no 3 (2010): 2.

[240] Toch and Aldeman, *Matchmaking: Enabling Mandatory Public School Choice in New York and Boston*, 5.

[241] Whitehurst and Whitfield, *The Education Choice and Competition: Background and Results 2011*, 4.

[242] Paul Teske, Jody Fitzpatrick, and Gabriel Kaplan, "The Information Gap," *Review of Policy Research* 23, no 5 (2006): 979.

[243] Ellie Rossiter, Executive Director, Parents for Public Schools San Francisco, Personal Interview, October 31, 2011.

[244] Brown Center on Education Policy at Brookings, "The Education Choice and Competition Index," http://www.brookings.edu/brown/ecci.aspx (accessed December 2011).

[245] Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools*, 62.

[246] Hemphill, et al., *The New Marketplace: How Small-School Reforms and School Choice Have Reshaped New York City's High Schools*, 6.

[247] "Fast Facts," U.S. Department of Education, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=66 (accessed December 2011). || "Ten Facts About K-12 Education," U.S. Department of Education, http://www2.ed.gov/about/overview/fed/10facts/index.html#return2 (accessed December 2011).

[248] Jason Riley, *Was the $5 Billion Worth It?* (New York City: *Wall Street Journal*, July 23, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576461571362279948.html#printMode (accessed January 2012).

[249] Charles Finn, et al., *Charter School Funding: Inequity's Next Frontier* (Washington, DC: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2005), 2. http://www.defendcharterschools.org/CharterSchoolFunding.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[250] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools* (Washington, DC: *Education Sector Reports*, November 2009), 6. http://www.educationsector.org/sites/default/files/publications/Growing_Pains.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[251] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*, 13-15.

[252] Elise Balboni, Wendy Berry and Charles Wolfson, *Charter School Bond Issuance: A Complete History* (New York: Local Initiatives Support Corporation, 2011), 5. http://www.lisc.org/docs/resources/effc/bond/2011_Charter_School_Bond_Issuance.pdf (accessed December 2011). || "Fast Facts: How many educational institutions exist in the United States?" National Center for Educational Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=84 (accessed December 2011).

[253] Betheny Gross, *Inside Charter Schools: Unlocking Doors to Student Success* (Seattle: National Charter Research Project, February 2011), 18, 23. http://www.crpe.org/cs/crpe/download/csr_files/pub_ICS_Unlock_Feb11.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[254] Jason Willis, et al., *Budgeting to Support Student Achievement: New Strategies for Central Office* (Providence: Annenberg Institute for School Reform, Fall 2010), 18. http://www.annenberginstitute.org/VUE/wp-content/pdf/VUE29.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[255] Whitehurst and Whitfield, *The Education Choice and Competition Index: Background and Results 2011,* 4.

[256] Godwin and Kemerer. *School Choice Tradeoffs: Liberty, Equity, and Diversity*, 176.

[257] Paul T. Hill, *School Financing in the Digital-Learning Era* (Washington, D.C.: Thomas B. Fordham Institute, 2011), 9.

[258] To be clear, this report found that the student-based budgeting did not reveal total success in improving equity or fostering innovation, though there are examples of success from both cities. Chambers, et al., *A Tale of Two Districts: A Comparative Study of Student-Based Funding and School-Based Decision Making in San Francisco and Oakland Unified School Districts*, 73-89.

[259] Matthew Hombeck, *A Principal's Perspective: Empowerment for Schools* (Providence: Annenberg Institute for School Reform, Fall 2010), 26. http://www.annenberginstitute.org/VUE/wp-content/pdf/VUE29.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[260] Michelle Taylor, *Charter School Launch Manual* (Boise: Idaho Department of Education, 2009, 49. http://www.sde.idaho.gov/site/charter_schools/research/Starting%20a%20Charter%20School/Charter%20School%20Launch%20Manual2009.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[261] New York City Charter School Center, *Funding for New York City Start-up/Replicating Charter Schools*, http://www.nyccharterschools.org/lead/for-school-leaders/school-finance (accessed December 2011).

[262] Allan Odden, "Manage 'Human Capital' Strategically" *Education Week*, April 1, 2011, http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2011/04/01/kappan_odden.html?qs=human+capital (accessed December 2011).

[263] *Ibid.*

[264] Herbert G. Heneman and Anthony T. Milanowski, "Assessing human resource practices alignment: A case study," *Human Resource Management*, 50, no. 1 (2011): 45–64.

[265] Odden, "Manage 'Human Capital' Strategically."

[266] Bethany Gross and Michael DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*? (Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, 2011), 4. http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/NAPCS_TeacherBrief_March2011_20110330T164201.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[267] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*.

[268] Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 5.

[269] Joseph Frey, "Relay School of Education (Formerly Teacher U): Master of Arts in Teaching (MAT) Program in Middle Childhood Education." Memo regarding school certification produced by the New York State Education Department, February 3, 2011: 11. http://www.regents.nysed.gov/meetings/2011Meetings/February2011/211hea2.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[270] Angelo Collins, "The Science of Teacher Development," *Education Week*, December 1, 2010. http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2010/12/01/13collins.h30.html?qs=teacher+development (accessed December 2011).

[271] Ruth Chung Wei, Linda Darling-Hammond, and Frank Adamson, *Professional development in the United States: Trends and challenges*. (Dallas, TX: National Staff Development Council, 2010). www.nsdc.org/news/NSDCstudytechnicalreport2010.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[272] Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 13-14.

[273] KIPP Fisher Fellowship: http://www.kipp.org/school-leaders/leadership-programs/fisher-fellowship (access January 2012).

[274] Uncommon Schools Operations Leader Fellowship: http://www.uncommonschools.org/sites/default/files/pdf/fellowship_opportunities_2011-2012_operations.pdf (accessed January 2012). || Uncommon School Instructional Leader Fellowship: http://www.uncommonschools.org/sites/default/files/pdf/fellowship_opportunities_2011-2012_instructional.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[275] New Leaders for New Schools, "What We Do," http://www.newleaders.org/what-we-do/ (accessed January 2012).

[276] David Stuit and Thomas Smith, *Teacher Turnover in Charter Schools*, unpublished draft (Nashville, TN: National Center on School Choice, Vanderbilt University), 22. http://www.vanderbilt.edu/schoolchoice/documents/stuit_smith_ncspe.pdf (accessed November 2011).

[277] Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 13-14.

[278] Gleason, et al., *The Evaluation of Charter School Impacts: Final Report,* 4-5.

[279] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*,11.

[280] Stuit and Thomas Smith, *Teacher Turnover in Charter Schools*, (unpublished draft), 26. || Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 15-16.

[281] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*,11.

[282] Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 13-14.

[283] Gross and DeArmond, *How do Charter Schools Get the Teachers They Want*?, 16.

[284] Therriault, et al., *Out of the Debate and into the Schools Comparing Practices and Strategies in Traditional, Pilot and Charter Schools in the City of Boston*, 22.

[285] Carol Ascher, et al., *The Finance Gap: Charter Schools and Their Facilities* (New York City: Institute for Education and Social Policy, Steinhardt School of Education New York University, 2004), 29. http://www.nyu.edu/steinhardt/iesp/The%20Finance%20Gap.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[286] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*, 6.

[287] Maria Sazon, *Making Room for New Public Schools,* (Washington, DC: National Alliance for Public Charter Schools, April 2011), 5. http://www.publiccharters.org/data/files/Publication_docs/2011 NAPCS Facilities Report - Making Room for New Public Schools_20110513T104057.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[288] *Growing Pains: Scaling Up the Nation's Best Charter Schools*, 6-7.

[289] Elise Balboni, et al., *Charter School Bond Issuance: A Complete Story*, (New York City: Local Initiatives Support Coalition, June 2011), 5. http://www.lisc.org/docs/resources/effc/bond/2011_Charter_School_Bond_Issuance.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[290] Ascher, et al., *The Finance Gap: Charter Schools and Their Facilities*, 13.

[291] *Making Charter School Facilities More Affordable: State-Driven Policy Approaches* (San Francisco, CA: WestEd for the U.S. Department of Education, Office of Innovation and Improvement, 2008), 21. http://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/charterfacilities/charterfacilities.pdf (accessed December 2011).

[292] *Ibid.*

[293] *Ibid.*

[294] Sharon Otterman, *Another Legal Challenge to the City's Charter Schools* (New York City: *The New York Times*, July 25, 2011) http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/25/another-legal-challenge-to-the-citys-charter-schools/ (accessed December 2011). || Fernanda Santos, *Teachers' Union Sues to Stop School Closings* (New York City: *The New York Times*, May 18, 2011) http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/18/teachers-union-sues-to-stop-school-closings/ (accessed December 2011).

[295] John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, *Politics, markets, and America's schools* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1990). || Little Hoover Commission, *The Charter Movement: Education Reform School by School* (Sacramento, CA: Commission on California State Government Organization and Economy, 1996).

[296] Paul Peterson, "School choice in Milwaukee," *Public Interest*, 125 (1996): 38-56.

[297] Ravitch, *The Death and Life of the Great American School System: How Testing and Choice Are Undermining Education*.

[298] New York City Charter School Center, "Parent Demand for NYC Charter Schools: Survey-Based Estimates," April 2011, http://resources.nyccharterschools.org/sites/default/files/Lottery2011Report%20v5.pdf (accessed January 2012).

[299] Recy Dunn, Executive Director, NYCDOE Charter Schools Office, and Jaclyn Leffel, Chief of Staff, NYCDOE Charter Schools Office, Personal Interview, November 18, 2011.

[300] Roslyn Arlin Mickelson, "The Academic Consequences of Desegregation and Segregation: Evidence From the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools" *North Carolina Law Review*, 81, no. 4 (2003): 1513-1562.

[301] Maisie Mcadoo, "UFT, NAACP sue to stop closings, co-locations" *United Federation of Teachers*, May 16, 2011 http://www.uft.org/news-stories/uft-naacp-sue-stop-closings-co-locations (accessed May 2011).

[302] *Open Enrollment: 50-State Report*, Education Commission of the States, 2011. http://1.usa.gov/usTBk2 (accessed December 2011).

[303] Kathryn A. McDermott, "Barriers to Large-Scale Success of Models for Urban School Reform" *Educational Evaluation and Policy Resources,* 22, no.1 (2000): 83-89.

[304] McDermott, "Barriers to Large-Scale Success of Models for Urban School Reform," 85.

[305] McDermott, "Barriers to Large-Scale Success of Models for Urban School Reform," 84.

[306] McDermott, "Barriers to Large-Scale Success of Models for Urban School Reform," 85.


PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
WOODROW
WILSON
SCHOOL
of Public & International Affairs